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ABSTRACT
Web 2.0 has generated a surplus of creativity, encouraging innovation of new technologies and
further creative expansion of the internet. Social media platforms have demonstrated a significant
growth during this time and have been used to create and disseminate a wealth of information and
cultural material. While it is important that copyright owners receive legal protection of the content
they create, it is necessary not to simultaneously stifle the creativity of end-users. Copyright owners
have more power in bargaining for their rights, and their rights are well established through
statutory protections. However, internet innovators and end-users, who may have a legitimate
defense of fair use, are at a disadvantage because the doctrine of fair use remains underdeveloped
and unclear in the realm of internet content. As such, at the current juncture, there is an imbalance
between the rights of copyright owners and the rights of technology innovators and end-users, which
needs to be remedied. Unfortunately, recent legislation has skewed the imbalance even further.
This article argues that judges should begin to interpret the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
(“DMCA”), secondary liability, and fair use doctrine to balance the strong statutory protections that
copyright owners enjoy. The DMCA should cover legitimate content sharing sites as long as the sites
comply with notice and takedown procedures. This article recommends changes that would benefit
technological innovators and the public interest by restoring a fair balance in copyright law for
innovators and users while maintaining a reasonable level of protection for content owners.
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FOSTERING WEB 2.0 INNOVATION: THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIAL
INTERPRETATION OF THE DMCA SAFE HARBOR, SECONDARY LIABILITY
AND FAIR USE
SUSANNA MONSEAU*
INTRODUCTION
There have been many thoughtful and creative suggestions for new laws to
resolve some of the tension between protecting intellectual property online,1
particularly copyrights, and encouraging the incredible growth of Web 2.0.2
However, unfortunately, it is highly improbable that Congress will pass legislation
encompassing any of these suggestions in the near future given its lack of
bipartisanship and the intense lobbying efforts of the copyright industry.3 Thus, it
seems much more likely that creating a workable balance between protecting
copyright online and fostering technological innovation will fall to the judiciary, a
reality which has been noted by judges in several jurisdictions.4
This paper describes the development of the participative internet5 and the
challenges it creates for copyright owners. After an explanation of recent statutory

* © Susanna Monseau 2012. Associate Professor of Business Law, The College of New Jersey.
I would like to thank Nicholas Falcone, B.S. Economics 2012, for his assistance with the research for
this article.
1 See, e.g., Jessica Litman, Real Copyright Reform, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1, 16, 40–45 (2011); Miriam
Bitton, Modernizing Copyright Law, 20 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 65, 94–95, 101 (2011); Warren B.
Chik, Paying it Forward: The Case for a Specific Statutory Limitation on Exclusive Rights for UserGenerated Content Under Copyright Law, 11 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 240, 242–44, 252
(2011); Lital Helman & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Best Available Technology Standard, 111
COLUM. L. REV. 1194, 1194–97 (2011).
2 See generally Tim O’Reilly, What is Web 2.0: Design Patterns and Business Models for the
Next Generation of Software, 65 COMM. & STRATEGIES 17, 18–19, 36–37 (2007) (defining Web 2.0
and suggesting that successful business strategies will necessarily accommodate the growth of Web
2.0).
3 See, e.g., Copyrights and Internet Piracy (SOPA and PIPA Legislation), N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 8,
2012), http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/c/copyrights/index.html?offset=0&
s=newest. One controversial measure, later reconsidered by lawmakers, would have required
“Internet service providers to block access to Web sites that offer or link to copyrighted material.”
Id.
4 See Annsley Merelle Ward, Global Forum on IP: Report 2, THE IP KAT (Jan. 14, 2011, 5:20
PM), http://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2011/01/global-forum-on-ip-report-2.html. It was reported that
Randall R. Rader, a federal circuit judge, opined at the Global Forum on IP that Intellectual
Property (“IP”) law was the most important regulatory agent in the new online marketplace but had
fallen dangerously behind new technology. Id. A judge of the Federal Supreme Court of Germany
said that legislation would play a very small role in IP rights in the next ten years, and thus, it
would fall to judges to protect the internet from the creation of overly strict IP laws. Id.
5 GRAHAM VICKERY & SACHA WUNSCH-VINCENT, ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV.
(“OECD”), PARTICIPATIVE WEB: USER-CREATED CONTENT 4 (2007), available at
http://www.oecd.org/internet/interneteconomy/38393115.pdf (defining the participative web as “an
Internet increasingly influenced by intelligent web services that empower the user to contribute to
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and common law developments in copyright law, it argues that the internet of the
future is going to be shaped by judges in cases like Viacom v. YouTube.6 The paper
contends that judicial interpretations, particularly of the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act (“DMCA”) safe harbors,7 and the common law doctrines of secondary
liability and fair use, can and should be interpreted by judges to balance the lengthy
statutory protection won by the copyright industries. The balance should be achieved
most particularly by ensuring that the DMCA safe harbors cover legitimate content
sharing sites as long as they utilize the notice and takedown procedures, but also by
limiting the application of secondary liability for copyright infringement to these
sites and clarifying the protection fair use affords for transformative new
technologies. The most important tasks for judges in these Web 2.0 copyright cases
are to avoid the overprotection of copyright owners’ rights and to provide legal
certainty about the boundaries of copyright protection.
Part I of the paper briefly describes the development of the “network as
platform” of Web 2.0.8 In less than a decade, the participative direction of the
internet,9 exemplified by video sharing sites like YouTube,10 online social networks,11
and other generative sites, has created immense benefits for society, while also
exacerbating problems for the copyright protected model of production.12 Part II
describes copyright legislation and common law developments in copyright law for
the digital age. The 1990s were a busy period for legislators on copyright issues. The
term of copyright protection and statutory damages were both increased,13 but
legislators also passed a safe harbor exemption to protect internet service providers
from liability for the infringing acts of their users.14 Since the design of the current

developing, rating, collaborating and distributing Internet content and developing and customising
Internet applications”).
6 Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 41 (2d Cir. 2012).
7 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2012).
8 See O’Reilly, supra note 2, at 18–19.
9 See VICKERY & WUNSCH-VINCENT, supra note 5, at 7. For a generalized discussion on the
history of computing and the Internet leading up to the participative era, see JONATHAN ZITTRAIN,
THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET—AND HOW TO STOP IT 19–62 (2008).
10 YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com (last visited Dec. 2, 2012).
11 danah m. boyd & Nicole B. Ellison, Social Network Sites:
Definition, History, and
Scholarship, 13 J. COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM. 2 (2007).
We define social network sites as web-based services that allow individuals
to (1) construct a public or semi-public profile within a bounded system,
(2) articulate a list of other users with whom they share a connection, and (3) view
and transverse their list of connections and those made by others within the
system.
Id.
12 See YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS 118–21 (2006).
13 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998);
Digital Theft Deterrence and Copyright Damages Improvement Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-160,
113 Stat. 1774.
14 See Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-304, 112
Stat. 2860, 2877–86 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2012)).
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statutory balance between content owners and technology innovators was mainly put
into place before the massive growth of Web 2.0, it has several shortcomings.15
Part III describes the positions of copyright owners and Web 2.0 platforms in
their battles over online use of copyright materials and analyzes the arguments used
by each side in their vision for the future regulation of Web 2.0. Part IV argues that
a fair balance between copyright owners, Web 2.0 platforms, and the public domain
can be, and is being, created through judicial interpretation, mostly of the existing
DMCA safe harbors, but also of the important copyright common law doctrines.
There are two important questions at the heart of the copyright and technology
debate. First, regarding the question of legal responsibility for infringement, should
it rest with those who create the technologies that can be used to infringe, or the
owners of the content infringed? This paper demonstrates that judges are clarifying
that it should, in most cases, be the job of copyright owners to police their own
property online and that legitimate web platforms should rarely be liable for the
activity of their users, absent specific awareness of infringing activity or a choice to
avoid such awareness by remaining willfully blind to such activity.16 Second, the
question for judicial interpretation concerns when copyrighted work can be used
online without the permission of the copyright owner. Fewer courts have considered
the application of the fair use doctrine in the online world,17 but fair use should
encourage, rather than hinder, the creation of new and socially beneficial ways to
manipulate copyrighted works and discourage the unproductive overprotection often
espoused by the copyright industries.18 In the continued absence of statutory
changes to copyright law, it will fall to judges to clarify the legal rights and duties of
copyright owners, web platforms, technology creators, and the millions of internet
users.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF WEB 2.0 AND ITS LEGAL ISSUES
The following section describes the growth of the internet, its traditional lack of
regulation, and the development of Web 2.0 platforms. It then turns to the
advantages that Web 2.0 creates for its users and the burdens it creates for the
copyright system of regulation. The term Web 2.0 was coined in 2005 to describe
systems with open standards that embraced the power of the web to harness

15 Amir Hassanabadi, Viacom v. YouTube: All Eyes Blind—The Limits of The DMCA in a Web
2.0 World, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 405, 416 (2011) (arguing that Congress failed to see the rise of
Web 2.0 when passing the DMCA); see also Lital Helman & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Best
Available Technology Standard, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1194, 1200, 1235–36 (2011) (arguing that the
DMCA is not the best way to protect copyright online and that webhosts should instead be required
to employ the best available filtering technology to avoid secondary liability for copyright
infringement because technology changes so quickly).
16 See infra Part III.B.
17 See Edward Lee, Technological Fair Use, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 797, 802 (2010). Technology
innovators may choose to seek permission from copyright owners for their innovations rather than
risk relying on fair use. Id.
18 See Mathew D. Bunker, Eroding Fair Use: The “Transformative” Use Doctrine After
Campbell, 7 COMM. L. & POL’Y 1, 1–2 (2002).
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collective intelligence and allow users to interact with and improve their web
experience.19 Web 2.0 includes interactive applications and platforms.20

A. The Early Internet and Regulation
From its inception, the internet has been a transformative and disruptive
technology, creating many new legal challenges.21 Early on in the development of the
internet, some pioneers believed that one of the great things about cyberspace was
that it needed no laws and that it should be free of government regulation or legal
control of any kind.22 However, it quickly became clear that governance of the online
world was similar in many ways to that of the offline world. Legal scholar Lawrence
Lessig details in Code: Version 2.0 how the internet is, in fact, not a “cyberspace of
anarchy,” but continues to evolve to a “cyberspace of control.”23 Lessig argues that
the internet is constrained by the same four forces: law, norms, market, and
architecture or code, which regulate activities in the real world.24
Many policies since the 1990s have, at least in the U.S., promoted self-regulation
of the internet. Congress’s moratorium on internet taxes25 and U.S. regulators’
hands-off approach—until recently—regarding online privacy26 and the free flow of
information27 are examples of this approach. As predicted by Lessig, computer
programmer decisions on the architecture of the internet or “code” and general
societal norms have created the design of much of today’s internet with little public
debate or consideration of which values we wish to build into the new online space.28
However, there are limits to what can be achieved without government “choos[ing]
the values we want cyberspace to embrace.”29 Both scholars30 and judges31 have
O’Reilly, supra note 2, at 18, 36–37.
See id. at 36–37.
21 See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: VERSION 2.0, at 169–275 (2006) [hereinafter CODE 2.0].
22 See id. at 3 (quoting John Perry Barlow, Grateful Dead lyricist and founder of the EFF,
“Governments of the Industrial World, you weary giants of flesh and steel, I come from Cyberspace,
the new home of Mind. On behalf of the future, I ask you of the past to leave us alone. You are not
welcome among us. You have no sovereignty where we gather.”).
23 Id. at 5.
24 Id. at 125.
25 Internet Tax Freedom Act Amendments Act of 2007, 47 U.S.C. § 151 note (2012).
26 See, e.g., Electronic Communications Privacy Act Amendments Act 2011, S. 1011, 112th
Cong. § 1; Do Not Track Kids Act of 2011, H.R. 1895, 112th Cong. § 1.
27 Ashley S. Pawlisz, The Bill of Unintended Consequences:
The Combating Online
Infringement and Counterfeit Act, 21 DEPAUL J. ART, TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 283, 290 (2011).
While a great number of countries around the globe implement some form of
Internet filtering to some degree, the United States has historically maintained
efforts to limit censorship and content blocking by governments. In a recent
speech, Secretary of State Hilary Clinton remarked that “[t]hose who disrupt the
free flow of information in our society or any others pose a threat to our economy,
our government, and our civil society.”
Id.
28 See CODE 2.0, supra note 21, at 311–12.
29 See id. at 313, 315.
19
20
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bemoaned that legislators have not risen to the challenge of regulating cyberspace in
a way beneficial to social welfare. Some also argue that the judiciary has also been
wary of using its powers to ascertain and protect important public values.32 There is
a clear sentiment among commentators, and even the general public, that the law,
and IP law in particular, has not kept up with the pace of technological advances.33
Thus, as technological progress continues, consideration is needed as to how society
wishes to regulate our new online world.
B. Web 2.0 and the Developing Need for Regulation
There has truly been an explosion of creative energy online in the last decade.
Jonathan Zittrain notes in The Future of the Internet and How to Stop It that the
internet is uniquely generative: It enables its user to experiment with new uses and
then share their innovations with each other.34 Yochai Benkler, in The Wealth of
Networks, has shown that, on the participative internet, external incentives for the
production of information goods are no longer absolutely necessary.35 Zittrain and
Benkler together “tell a story about how the combination of individual freedom and a
cooperative ethos have driven the Internet’s astonishing growth.”36 Regarding the
regulation of the internet, Benkler argues that the manifest benefits of the
networked information economy for culture are not particularly reliant on state
action; in fact, the state often supports the “incumbents of the industrial information
economy” where it should “adjust its policies to facilitate non-market action . . . .”37
Benkler, like Lessig and Tim Wu,38 sees a role for regulation by the liberal state to
shape the online environment and provide the conditions for individuals to use the
new technologies to the best advantage.39
C. Web 2.0 Sites and Beyond
Zittrain’s generative internet is exemplified by the growth of the platforms and
applications that put the user in control of creativity and distribution. Often called
Web 2.0, this internet is very different from the more passive service provided to
users in the initial internet age. The internet platforms that comprise Web 2.0 allow
users to interact and collaborate with each other to a much greater extent than they
30 See, e.g., JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET? ILLUSIONS OF A
BORDERLESS WORLD (2006).
31 See Ward, supra note 4.
32 See CODE 2.0, supra note 21, at 325.
33 See, e.g., Lee, supra note 17, at 797.
34 ZITTRAIN, supra note 9, at 71–74.
35 See BENKLER, supra note 12, at 116–22.
36 James Grimmelman, The Internet is a Semicommons, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2799, 2799
(2010).
37 BENKLER, supra note 12, at 22.
38 GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 30.
39 BENKLER, supra note 12, at 22.
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were previously able. This paper discusses cases like Viacom v. YouTube40 that will
determine how the internet is regulated and thus influence the continued
development of Web 2.0 and subsequent communicative technologies. Innovators
and technicians are already discussing the concept of a Web 3.0, which will put the
user even more at the center of control, enable the user to make sense of data, and
expand the utility of the web.41 This may or may not be the future direction of
technology, but in order to discuss the regulation of the internet, we need to provide
some description of the current internet and its utility.
1. Sharing Sites and YouTube
Web 2.0 enables users to post and share content. Multiple online forums exist
that are devoted to such activity, including web logs (blogs) and wikis. Princeton
University defines a blog as “a shared on-line journal where people can post diary
entries about their personal experiences and hobbies.”42 These online spaces have
flourished in the Web 2.0 era and become major methods of communication that are
very present in culture; the New York Times maintains a “Blogs 101” page that
organizes notable blogs by their subject matter.43 Blogging is done increasingly by
educated adults44 on a regular basis45 and sometimes for pay.46
Wikis are structured somewhat differently than blogs.
They require
participants to “co-produce a document by sequentially editing and or commenting on
an emerging project.”47 As such, they can be used to create documents for
commercial, academic, and social purposes. Wikipedia, the best known wiki, defines
itself as “a multilingual, web-based, free-content encyclopedia project based on an
openly editable model.”48 Wikipedia, a massive collection of information available to
internet users, consists of over four million content pages of which there have been

Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19 (2012).
See
Cade
Metz,
Web
3.0,
PCMAG.COM
(Mar.
14,
2007),
http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2102852,00.asp.
42 WordNet Search—3.1, PRINCETON U., http://wordnetweb.princeton.edu/perl/webwn?s=blog
(last visited Dec. 2, 2012).
43 Rich Meislin, Blogs 101, N.Y. TIMES, http://www.nytimes.com/ref/technology/blogs_101.html
(last visited Dec. 2, 2012).
44 See
State of the Blogosphere 2009, TECHNORATI, http://technorati.com/socialmedia/feature/state-of-the-blogosphere-2009/ (last visited Dec. 2, 2012); Adam Singer, 70 Usable
Stats From the 2009 State of the Blogosphere, THE FUTURE BUZZ (Dec. 10, 2009),
http://thefuturebuzz.com/2009/12/10/blogging-stats-facts-data/.
Seventy percent of bloggers
surveyed have college degrees, more than half are married, and more than half are parents. Singer,
supra.
45 Singer, supra note 44. Fifteen percent of respondents spend ten or more hours each week
blogging. Id. The most common rate of updating is two to three times per week. Id.
46 Id. Seventy-two percent of respondents report no income related to blogging and fifteen
percent say they are paid to give speeches on their blog topics. Id.
47 Mark Cooper, From Wifi to Wikis and Open Source: The Political Economy of Collaborative
Production in the Digital Information Age, 5 J.L. & HIGH TECH. 125, 148 (2006).
48 Wikipedia:
About, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:About (last visited
Dec. 2, 2012).
40
41
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over 500 million page edits since the establishment of the site.49 It, unsurprisingly,
joins the ranks of internet companies that value and promote the free flow of
information online.
Another sharing site, YouTube, has exemplified free information flow as one of
the most popular websites in the Web 2.0 era with its grass-roots, community-driven,
video-sharing platform.50 The magnitude of YouTube’s cultural reach can be derived
from its various statistics. Users upload a massive amount of video on a regular
basis; as of September 2012, seventy-two hours were uploaded every minute and over
eleven years were uploaded every day.51 More video is uploaded to YouTube in one
month than the three major United States television networks created in sixty
years,52 a signal of the generative power of Web 2.0. The power has a global reach:
YouTube is localized in forty-three countries across sixty languages, and seventy
percent of its traffic comes from outside the United States.53
YouTube likely would not have achieved this type of success if it had followed a
different growth strategy. Early in its lifetime, its founders decided against running
pre-roll advertisements,54 despite the fact that the ads would have generated revenue
to help YouTube’s bottom line in struggling months.55 The lack of ads contributed to
the community feel of the site and prevented YouTube from garnering a “Big Media”
reputation.56 This perception of the site has allowed it to fit perfectly into the social
media atmosphere that has come to dominate Web 2.0. “More than 50% of videos on
YouTube have been rated by or include comments from the community[,]” and ”100million users take a social action on YouTube . . . every week.”57 As of October 2012,
YouTube was available on 350 million mobile devices;58 500 years’ worth of YouTube
video was watched every day on Facebook;59 and over 700 YouTube videos were
tweeted each minute on Twitter.60
2. Online Social Networks
Social networks are some of the most popular types of Web 2.0 platforms. The
first recognizable social network website, SixDegrees.com, was launched in 1997 and
allowed users to perform many of the functions with which they are now familiar,
49

2012).

Statistics, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:Statistics (last visited Dec. 2,

50 John
Cloud, The YouTube Gurus, TIME MAG. at 2 (Dec. 25, 2006),
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1570795-1,00.html.
51 Statistics, YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/t/press_statistics (last visited Dec. 2, 2012).
52 Id. Roughly 2.9 million hours of video is uploaded each month to YouTube, whereas the
three major networks combined, broadcasting for twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, for
sixty years amounts to only about 1.6 million hours of video.
53 Id.
54 Cloud, supra note 50, at 7. Pre-roll advertisements are ads that play before videos begin. Id.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Statistics, supra note 51.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Id.
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including creating profiles and listing their friends.61 Social media gained popularity
in the U.S. in 2002 with the arrival of Friendster.62 Facebook, which originated in a
Harvard dormitory as a social service for college students,63 is today’s most popular
social networking site with 955 million monthly active users as of June 2012, and the
site is still growing.64 Facebook has become a global phenomenon; more than eighty
percent of its current users live outside the United States and Canada,65 and the
website is available in more than seventy languages.66 Global time spent on social
network sites increased eighty-two percent from 2008 to 2009,67 and since October
2010, internet users in China, Latin America, and the Middle East became engaged
in more social networking than those in the United States and Japan.68 This
worldwide reach makes the benefits of online social networks more widely accessible
and thus more impactful.
D. The Social Benefits of Web 2.0: Communication, Community and Identity
YouTube and other video and photo sharing sites, Facebook and all of the other
online social networks, along with sites like Twitter,69 Tumblr,70 the newer
Pinterest,71 and a bewildering number of blogs, wikis, and other interactive or
collaborative sites have quickly come to stand at the forefront of the global
communications landscape.72 These technologies have fundamentally changed how
people interact with each other and use the medium.73 Facebook is currently the
most visited website in the U.S., and YouTube was the second most searched term on
See boyd & Ellison, supra note 11.
See James Grimmelmann, Saving Facebook, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1137, 1144 (2009) (providing a
history of social media sites).
63 Id. at 1144–45.
64 Key Facts, FACEBOOK, http://newsroom.fb.com/content/default.aspx?NewsAreaId=22 (last
visited Dec. 2, 2012).
65 Id.
66 Internationalization,
FACEBOOK, http://developers.facebook.com/docs/internationalization/
(last visited Dec. 2, 2012).
67 See Led by Facebook, Twitter, Global Time Spent on Social Media Sites up 82% Year over
Year, NIELSENWIRE (Jan. 22, 2010), http://blog.nielsen.com/nielsenwire/global/led-by-facebooktwitter-global-time-spent-on-social-media-sites-up-82-year-over-year/.
68 Steven Hoffer, Social Networking Goes Even More Global, AOLNEWS, (Oct. 11, 2010, 3:16
PM), http://www.aolnews.com/2010/10/11/study-social-networking-goes-even-more-global-beats-email-tv/.
69 TWITTER, https://www.Twitter.com/ (last visited Dec. 2, 2012).
70 TUMBLR, https://www.tumblr.com/ (last visited Dec. 2, 2012).
71 PINTEREST, http://pinterest.com/ (last visited Dec. 2, 2012).
72 See Led by Facebook, supra note 67 (“[S]ocial networks and blogs are the most popular online
category when ranked by average time spent . . . ” and “consumers spent more than five and a half
hours on social networking sites like Facebook and Twitter in December 2009, an 82% increase from
the same time last year . . . . ”).
73 See, e.g., Josh Kron & J. David Goodman, Online, a Distant Conflict Soars to Topic No. 1,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2012, at A1, (exemplifying the spread of news and ideas through viral videos).
It took only four days for a video, intended to create awareness about a war that happened in
Uganda, to go viral on the internet, when diplomats, academics, and Ugandans had worked for
decades to get that kind of attention for the issue. Id.
61
62
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Google in 2011.74 The benefits of an internet on which users are not merely passive
viewers of information, but can participate, create, and collaborate in using
information have been divided by some scholars into three main types:
communication, community, and identity.75 Facebook and YouTube exemplify the
benefits of the participative internet. These sites enable communication between
many individuals (communication), the formation of groups of like-minded
individuals (community), and the dissemination and collection of reputational
information (identity).
Web 2.0 enables users to create and share vast amounts of content with many
people on their own terms.76 The creation and sharing of user generated content
(“UGC”)77 has fueled the massive expansion of sites, like YouTube, where hours of
video are uploaded every minute.78 As noted by James Grimmelman, these sites
have been more successful than most other sites on the internet:
The last half-decade on the Web has been the great era of UGC sites like
YouTube, Flickr, Facebook, and Twitter—all of which offer users access to
content uploaded, for unpaid sharing, by other users. Sharing makes the
Web go round. There’s also a strong argument that many of these sharingbased sites are successfully outcompeting their more restricted
competitors.79
YouTube emphasizes, in its brief on Viacom’s appeal of the district court
decision, that it is the grassroots creativity and sharing aspect of the site that leads
to its success. “YouTube gives creators of every kind the ability to promote their
work to a global audience—all free of charge and editorial control.”80

74 Facebook
Was the Top Search Term for Third Straight Year, EXPERIAN,
http://www.experian.com/hitwise/press-release-facebook-was-the-top-search-term-for-2011.html (last
visited Dec. 2, 2012).
75 Nicole Ellison, Charles Steinfield, & Clarke Lampe, The Benefits of Facebook “Friends:”
Social Capital and College Students’ Use of Online Social Network Sites, 12 J. OF COMPUTERMEDIATED COMM., no. 4, 2007, available at http://jcmc.indiana.edu/vol12/issue4/ellison.html.
76 See Noam Cohen, A Video Campaign and the Power of Simplicity, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2012,
at B2 (describing how the viral video about Joseph Kony had 71 million views on YouTube in 4 days
and demonstrated “the untapped power of the viewer.”); e.g., Lawrence Lessig, In Defense of Piracy,
WALL ST. J. (Oct. 11, 2008), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122367645363324303.html.
77 VICKERY & WUNSCH-VINCENT, supra note 5, at 4 (defining “user-created content” (UCC) as:
“i) content made publicly available over the Internet, ii) which reflects a certain amount of creative
effort, and iii) which is created outside of professional routines and practices”).
78 Statistics, supra note 51.
79 Grimmelmann supra note 36, at 2814.
80 Brief for Defendants-Appellees at 3, Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19 (2d Cir.
Mar. 31, 2011) (Nos. 10-3342-cv, 10-3270), 2011 WL 1356930 [hereinafter Brief for Defendants in
Viacom v. YouTube].
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E. Copyright Industry’s Business Model Clashes with Web 2.0
The creating and sharing of content online obviously creates new challenges for
copyrights, and copyright owners have spent much of the last decade complaining
vociferously about the problems created by Web 2.0. For years, they have been
saying that American businesses lose hundreds of thousands of jobs to online piracy
and counterfeiting each year.81 Many outside the traditional copyright industries,
like entertainment, are deeply skeptical about the piracy figures that the industry
uses.82 Skeptics also contend that any “losses due to piracy are far outweighed by the
benefits of the free flow of information . . . .”83 In fact, the Electronic Frontier
Foundation (“EFF”) notes that despite its ongoing lawsuit against YouTube, Viacom
has already benefited financially from uploading clips of its programming to
YouTube.84
So far, copyright owners have been very adept at lobbying to protect and
advance their rights through legislation, the dramatic advances in digital technology
over the last two decades being the main spur for these actions.85 They have
successfully argued that, because copying and distribution made possible by digital
technology can easily destroy the copyright-based business model, the adequate
protection of their rights requires a strengthening of the whole copyright system.86
On the other side of the debate, many commentators have suggested that this
apocalyptic vision of the copyright industries—that digital technology will bring
about the demise of copyright and that strong measures are required to protect
intellectual property—is not only incorrect, but has been put forward by copyright
owners before as an excuse for strengthening the system. They assert that the
overuse and strict enforcement of the proprietary copyright model of production will
turn the internet into a permission-based space87 and that many of the benefits of the
156 CONG. REC. S7207 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 2010) (statement by Rep. Leahy).
Jenna Wortham & Amy Chozick, The Piracy Problem: How Broad?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2012
at B1 (stating that digital rights groups have urged Congress to quantify effects of piracy from
“accurate and unbiased sources”).
83 Id.
84 Abigail Phillips, Viacom Round-Up: Still Complaining About YouTube Even as They Profit
from
It,
ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER
FOUND.
(Dec.
17,
2010),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2010/12/viacom-round-still-complaining-about-youtube-even.
85 See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Conflicting Visions and Contested Baselines: Intellectual Property
and Free Speech in the Digital Millennium, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1318, 1321 (2005) (explaining that, for
many copyright owners, “the crucial aspect of the status quo is not legal but economic” because
“[d]igital media make[s] it possible to make a virtually infinite number of exact copies at little or no
cost”).
86 See, e.g., Susanna Monseau, Fit For Purpose: Why the European Union Should Not Extend
the Term of Related Rights Protection in Europe, 19 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 629,
647 (2009).
87 Helman & Parchomovsky, supra note 15, at 1209–10.
Online speech is further diminished as a consequence of private
arrangements between content owners and webhosts. The most well known
private agreement in this context is the “User Generated Content Principles”
(UGC Principles) that was established in 2007 by leading content producers such
as Disney and Viacom, and service providers, including Microsoft and MySpace.
Such agreements provide webhosts with semicontractual protection against
81
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new participative internet that enhance community, communication, and identity
among ordinary people will be weakened. Commentators note that many other
changes in technology have appeared in the past to threaten the protection afforded
by the copyright system (such as sheet music, the gramophone, photocopiers, and
videocassette recorders (“VCRs”),88 to name a few), but after an initial period during
which copyright owners predict the imminent demise of the copyright system, it has
always survived.89 We are merely experiencing the advent of another new technology
to which the players will adjust; no radical changes to the legal system are
required.90
Some academics and technology mavens contend that while digital technology
and the internet have indeed changed the status quo, the best response is not to
strengthen the law, as copyright owners argue, but to radically change or even
abolish it because the current copyright law regime is totally unsuited to the realities
of the digital age.91 According to Daniel Farber, “[a] new technology always presents
the question of whether an existing legal regime should apply.”92 Lawrence Lessig
has argued for a long time that the balance in copyright law embodied in the
Constitution has become so skewed by the powerful economic and corporate forces in
favor of protecting the monopoly rights of media corporations for near perpetual
terms that a radical overhaul of copyright law is now needed.93 There have also been
many other thoughtful suggestions for significant statutory amendments to copyright
law in order to deal with the digital age.94 The debate about copyright law shows no
sign of abating.95 The cases discussed later in this paper will be important in
determining whether the current system can be adapted to Web 2.0 or whether we
are witnessing the demise of the copyright incentive scheme.
II. COPYRIGHT LAW IN THE DIGITAL WORLD
The next section describes the statutory development of copyright law during
the digital age, and how digital issues have also shaped the common law doctrines of
fair use and secondary liability.

Id.

liability in exchange for their agreement to take various measures to curb
copyright infringements by users, including employment of filtering systems.

88 See Monseau, supra note 86, at 649; Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios Inc., 464
U.S. 417, 419–20 (1984).
89 See GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 30, at 106.
90 Id.
91 See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: THE NATURE AND FUTURE OF CREATIVITY 192–
94 (2004) (describing the inefficiencies in copyright law and arguing that, while laws can be created
to regulate copyrighted internet content, the laws would “impose significant burdens and costs on
the technology, [and would] likely be eclipsed by advances around exactly those requirements”)
[hereinafter FREE CULTURE].
92 Farber, supra note 85, at 1322.
93 See id., at 1326–27.
94 See, e.g., Chik, supra note 1, at 255.
95 See, e.g., Stop Online Piracy Act, H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. (2011).
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A. The Purpose of Copyright
The Framers of the U.S. Constitution wanted to provide a balance between
creators and innovators and the public.96 The U.S. Constitution allowed Congress to
make laws “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries[.]”97 James Madison, who introduced the copyright and
patent clause into the Constitution, argued in The Federalist that it would benefit the
public at the same time as benefiting authors and inventors.98 It can be argued that
the internet has changed the incentives for creators sufficiently, so that a primarily
proprietary model is no longer necessary to promote creativity.99
The first U.S. Copyright Act of 1790 provided fairly limited protection for which
registration was required.100 For more than 120 years, U.S. copyright law adhered to
a regime of fairly limited protection101 and a strong public domain.102 Recently, there
has been a pronounced swing toward stronger copyright protection through
legislation.103
B. Digital Copyright Legislation
The last two decades have witnessed battles between those who think the
copyright system needs strengthening to cope with the digital threat and those who
urge the promotion of new technology.104 U.S. copyright laws have undergone huge
change, partially to bring them into compliance with a large number of international
treaties—Berne Convention, the Universal Copyright Convention, and Agreement on
the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)105—but also
because of heavy lobbying by the copyright industries.106 All of these treaties
required signatories to adhere to minimum protections for copyright and various
See Lawrence Lessig, Copyright’s First Amendment, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1057, 1072 (2001).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added).
98 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 43 (James Madison).
99 BENKLER, supra note 12, at 91–92.
100 Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (Copyright Act of 1790).
101 See SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, COPYRIGHT AND COPYWRONGS 25 (2001). In 1831, the copyright
term remained a twenty-eight year term, renewable for fourteen years. Id. Under the 1909 Act, the
term was extended to a twenty-eight year term, renewable for twenty-eight more years. Id.
102 See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv., 499 U.S. 340, 350–51 (1991) (relying on Baker v.
Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 103 (1879), to deny copyright protection to a list of names, towns, and telephone
numbers); Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834).
103 See VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 101, at 25.
104 See supra Section I.E.
105 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, revised
July 24, 1971, amended Sept. 29, 1979, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter the Berne Convention]; The
Universal Copyright Convention, July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 943 U.N.T.S. 178; Agreement on the
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, Apr. 15,
1994, 108 Stat. 4809, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299.
106 See, e.g., Jenna Wortham, A Political Coming of Age for the Tech Industry, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
18, 2012, at A1.
96
97
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related rights.
Signatories to the Berne Convention, the most important
international treaty to copyright law, are required to protect copyright for a
minimum term of the life of the author plus fifty years.107
Within ten years of joining the Berne Convention, ostensibly to harmonize with
E.U. law, but at least partially due to intense lobbying by the content industries,108
U.S. law was further amended to increase the term of copyright protection from life
plus fifty years to life plus seventy years, or ninety-five years for works made for
hire.109 Despite increasing the term of protection enormously and getting the
registration requirement eliminated, copyright owners continue to argue for further
strengthening of their rights.110
Some exceptions have been drafted into statutes to protect technology industries
and the public domain from the very broad powers of copyright holders.111 Probably
the most important protections in U.S. law for those providing platforms for UGC
were created in the 1990s in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”).
1. A Balancing Act for the Digital Millennium
In 1998, the U.S. Congress passed the DMCA112 to implement the World
Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”) treaties.113 It included a provision of
liability limitation for copyright infringement for “service providers” (“ISPs”) for
various common activities.114 These so called “safe harbors” are proving to be
important protections for Web 2.0 companies that host creative content.115
Before the Act’s passage the Senate Committee on the Judiciary Report on the
DMCA noted the concerns of copyright owners about the digital revolution, stating
that because of “the ease with which digital works can be copied and distributed
107 See Berne Convention, supra note 105, art. 7. The U.S. became a signatory of the Berne
Convention in 1989, one hundred years after its creation, dropping its longstanding registration
tradition for copyright to allow copyrighted work to be protected from creation, without the need for
formalities. Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, sec. 9, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat.
2853, 2859. This brought U.S. copyright law into line with most other nations in the world. See
House Report on the Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, H.R. REP. NO. 100-609.
108 See Christina N. Gifford, The Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, 30 U. MEM. L.
REV. 363, 364 (2000).
109 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, § 102, 112 Stat. 2827, 2827
(1998) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 302(a)–(b) (2012)).
110 Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Adrift in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act: The Sequel,
26 U. DAYTON L. REV. 279, 279 (2001).
111 See, e.g., 47 U.S.C § 230 (2012).
112 Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), Pub. L. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
113 Id. secs. 101–05, 112 Stat. at 2861–77; see also Treaties, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG.,
http://www.wipo.int/copyright/en/treaties.htm (last visited Dec. 2, 2012) (providing a list of WIPO
treaties enacted in furtherance of copyrights).
114 DCMA sec. 202, § 512, 112 Stat. at 2877–86. A service provider is defined as “ an entity
offering the transmission, routing, or providing of connections for digital online communications … .
. . of material of the user’s choosing, without modifications to the content of the material as sent or
received” and as “a provider of online services or network access[.]” Id. sec. 202, § 512(k)(1).
115 See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1158 (2007).
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worldwide virtually instantaneously, copyright owners will hesitate to make their
works readily available on the Internet without reasonable assurance that they will
be protected against massive piracy.”116 The Committee also foresaw how copyright
liability could chill innovation online.117 “[W]ithout clarification of their liability,
service providers may hesitate to make the necessary investment in the expansion of
the speed and capacity of the Internet.”118 The purpose of Title II of the DMCA was
to “[ensure] that the efficiency of the Internet [would] continue to improve and that
the variety and quality of services on the Internet [would] expand” by limiting the
liability of service providers for their users’ copyright infringement.119
The Act left the law on secondary liability for copyright infringement in its
evolving state,120 but opted “to create a series of ‘safe harbors’ for certain common
activities of service providers”—a term which covers internet service providers like
Yahoo! and Web 2.0 sites like YouTube—such as transmitting material uploaded by
third parties,121 “storage at the direction of a user,”122 or providing “information
location tools.”123 The exemptions from liability are subject to various conditions
including, in most cases, that the service provider must not have “actual knowledge,
[nor be] aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is
apparent[.]”124 If the service provider obtains actual knowledge of infringement, it
must act expeditiously to remove the material.125 The service provider must also
provide a designated agent to receive such notifications of claimed infringement.126
This means that a webhost that falls within the definition of a service provider
should not have to be concerned about being held liable for copyright infringement
for material hosted on its site absent actual knowledge of specific acts of
infringement or information from which infringement is apparent. Defining this socalled “red flag” knowledge has been one of the biggest challenges for courts in
determining whether sites are exempt from liability under the DMCA safe harbors
for their users’ infringing activities.127
Unfortunately, the DMCA was passed long before the participative internet
became a reality (the earliest file-sharing site, Napster, was created seven months
after the act was signed),128 and some argue that it is not always easy to adapt to
issues arising on today’s internet.129 The Act raises a number of interesting
S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 8 (1998).
Id.
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 Id. at 19.
121 17 U.S.C. § 512 (a)(l) (2012).
122 Id. § 512(c)(1).
123 Id. § 512 (d).
124 Id. § 512 (c)(1)(A)(ii).
125 Id. § 512 (c)(1)(A)(iii).
126 Id. § 512 (c)(2).
127 See, e.g., Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 31 (2d Cir. 2012); UMG v. Shelter
Capital, 667 F.3d 1022, 1038–40 (9th Cir 2011).
128 Timeline of Events in Napster Case, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS (Feb. 12, 2003 2:41 PM),
http://hosting.uaa.alaska.edu/auiser/econ359/links/Napstertimeline.htm.
129 See, e.g., Helman & Parchomovsky, supra note 15, at 1198–2000; Hassanabadi, supra note
15, at 416.
116
117
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questions with respect to Web 2.0 internet platforms. The primary issue is what
circumstances are sufficient to give rise to “red flag” knowledge of infringement and,
especially, whether generalized knowledge of infringement is sufficient to lose the
safe harbor protection.130 It also remains unclear, due to differences in the case law,
which types of activities by service providers can cause them to lose protection.131
2. Copyright Holders Reassert Themselves to Stop Online Piracy
Copyright industry lobbying efforts have redoubled of late. The Stop Online
Piracy Act (“SOPA”) originated in the United States House of Representatives as an
attempt to combat the continued infringement of copyrighted works on the internet.
SOPA takes aim at search engines like Google and Yahoo, payment processors, ad
servers, ISPs, and other online services.132 Under SOPA, private companies could
simply serve notices on ISPs for hosting content that they say infringes copyright, a
departure both from the immunity granted to online service providers by the
DMCA133 and also the requirement to prove a case in court. Its Senate counterpart,
the Protect Intellectual Property Act (“PIPA”), targets domain name providers and ad
servers, but not ISPs.134 Provisions in SOPA would allow rights holders to proceed
against allegedly infringing sites without any court hearing or judicial intervention
and allow the government to prevent search engines from pointing to such sites.
Both pieces of legislation regulate domestic operations because most of the foreign-

130 Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2012). The Second Circuit Court of
Appeals in Viacom v. YouTube held that YouTube is protected from liability except where the
company was willfully blind to infringement. Id. at 35. For an analysis of the court’s ruling, see
Corynne McSherry, Viacom v. Google: A Decision at Last, and It’s Mostly Good (for the Internet and
FRONTIER
FOUND.
(Apr.
5,
2012),
Innovation),
ELECTRONIC
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/04/viacom-v-google-decision.
131 Compare Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 36–37 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that
knowledge of specific and identifiable infringements, combined with the replication, transmittal or
display of videos on a website may cause a service provider to lose protection), with UMG
Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners, LLC., 667 F.3d 1022, 1041–43 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding
that “[a] service provider is eligible for [safe harbor protection] only if it ‘does not receive a financial
benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity, in a case in which the service provider has the
right and ability to control the infringing activity’”).
132 Copyrights
and Internet Piracy (SOPA and PIPA Legislation), N.Y. TIMES,
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/c/copyrights/index.html?offset=0&s=new
est (last updated Feb. 8, 2012). One controversial measure later reconsidered by lawmakers would
have required “Internet service providers to block access to sites that offer or link to copyrighted
material.” Id.
133 Compare Stop Online Piracy Act, H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. § 103 (2011) (explaining that a
plaintiff may notify a payment network provider or Internet advertising service of infringing activity
and action must be taken to remedy the situation within five days), with Digital Millennium
Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, sec. 202, § 512, 112 Stat. 2860, 2877–86 (1998) (codified as
amended at 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2012)) (providing a defendant ISP with immunity from copyright
infringement if certain conditions are met).
134 David
Carr, The Danger of an Attack on Piracy Online, N.Y. TIMES,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/02/business/media/the-danger-of-an-attack-on-piracyonline.html?ref=copyrights (last updated Jan. 5, 2012).
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based pirate sites in question operate outside of the U.S. legal system.135 In the U.S.,
the bills are supported by copyright lobbyists like the Motion Picture Association of
America as well as the United States Chamber of Commerce and opposed by free
speech advocates and internet companies. SOPA and PIPA have taken center stage
in the discussion of both how and how much the government should regulate the use
of intellectual property in the age of Web 2.0.
Lamar Smith, the United States Representative from Texas who introduced
SOPA, has noted that the legislation is supported by multiple industries and has
questioned the “motives of ‘big Internet guys,’ like Google, that oppose SOPA.”136
Smith argues that SOPA is designed to serve the important purpose of protecting
consumers and businesses from the illegal theft of American intellectual property.137
Of course, copyright holders have a strong interest in this protection and
enthusiastically support SOPA. Cary Sherman, the chairman of the Recording
Industry Association of America, writes that pirate sites are a substantial reason for
the industry’s seven billion dollar decline in revenue during the last decade and,
therefore, that protecting IP rights is imperative.138 Sherman argues that the
interests of the entertainment industry and internet community are not counter to
each other, but rather are intertwined: By supporting SOPA and protecting rights
holders, we can “stimulate further legitimate online growth by making sure that
thieves operating offshore can’t tilt the playing field against legal services.”139
This view is not held unanimously. In a letter to Congress, a collection of
technology companies wrote about SOPA and PIPA:
We support the bills’ stated goals—providing additional enforcement tools
to combat foreign “rogue” websites that are dedicated to copyright
infringement or counterfeiting.. Unfortunately, the bills as drafted would
expose law-abiding U.S. Internet and technology companies to new and
uncertain liabilities, private rights of action, and technology mandates that
would require monitoring of websites.140
The sentiment voiced in the letter has been echoed by other commentators. A
general concern, voiced by First Amendment lawyer Laurence H. Tribe, is that
SOPA’s “very existence would dramatically chill protected speech by undermining the
openness and free exchange of information at the heart of the Internet.”141 According

Id.
Lamar Smith, Fighting Online Piracy, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2012, at A22. Because Google
and other search engines benefit from the ability to direct users to “illegal foreign websites,” Smith
writes that their motives for opposing the legislation are self-serving. Id.
137 Id.
138 Cary Sherman, RIAA Chief: Copyright Bills Won’t Kill the Internet, CNET NEWS (Nov. 8,
2011 6:13 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-57320417-93/riaa-chief-copyright-bills-wont-killthe-internet/?part=rss&tag=feed&subj=News-DigitalMedia.
139 Id.
140 Letter from Internet and Technology Companies to Members of Congress, (Nov. 15, 2011),
available at http://www.rue89.com/sites/news/files/assets/document/2011/11/pagenewyorktimes.pdf.
141 Laurence H. Tribe, The “Stop Online Piracy Act” (SOPA) Violates the First Amendment, at 4
(Dec. 6, 2011), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/75153093/Tribe-Legis-Memo-on-SOPA-12-6135
136

[12:70 2012]Fostering Web 2.0 Innovation: The Role of the Judicial Interpretation 87
of the DMCA Safe Harbor, Secondary Liability and Fair Use

to Mark Lemley, David S. Levine, and David G. Post, the notification procedures
used in SOPA and PIPA are inconsistent with the United States’ history of protecting
free expression; they argue that SOPA and PIPA and their underlying philosophy
“represent a dramatic retreat from this country’s tradition of leadership in
supporting the free exchange of information and ideas on the Internet.”142 They note
that the bills would codify in U.S. law principles closely associated with repressive
foreign governments, namely “a right to insist on the removal of content from the
global Internet, regardless of where it may have originated or be located, in service of
the exigencies of domestic law.”143
The White House has replied in kind to the controversy surrounding the
legislation. In response to two petitions, executive officials posted an online
summary of the White House position called Combating Online Piracy While
Protecting an Open and Innovative Internet.144 The response emphasizes two points:
(1) that “[a]ny effort to combat online piracy must guard against the risk of online
censorship of lawful activity and must not inhibit innovation” and (2) that “[w]e must
avoid creating new cybersecurity risks or disrupting the underlying architecture of
the Internet.”145
A day of protest by millions of internet websites and users had the intended
effect of defeating the bill.146 The day after, the Justice Department shut down the
popular file-sharing site, Megaupload, demonstrating to many observers that it had
ample powers to deal with online piracy without new laws.147 However, although
their push for stronger copyright protection online was defeated in this instance, it
seems that the copyright industries have not given up on passing legislation and are
already trying to revive SOPA in a new form.148

11-1. Tribe breaks down various SOPA provisions and analyzes the ways in which they violate the
Constitution. Id. at 7–21.
142 Mark Lemley et al., Don’t Break the Internet, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 34, 37 (2011),
available at http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/sites/default/files/online/articles/64-SLRO-34_0.pdf.
143 Id.
144 Victoria Espinel et al., Combating Online Piracy While Protecting an Open and Innovative
Internet, THE WHITE HOUSE, https://wwws.whitehouse.gov/petition-tool/response/combating-onlinepiracy-while-protecting-open-and-innovative-internet (last visited Dec. 2, 2012). This was the
official White House response to two petitions, which are listed at the above web address: “Stop the
E-PARASITE Act” and “VETO the SOPA bill and any other future bills that threaten to diminish
the free flow of information.” Id.
145 Id.
146 Roger Yu, SOPA Protest Gets Intended Effect, USA TODAY (Jan. 18, 2012 8:03 PM),
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/industries/technology/story/2012-01-18/SOPA-PIPA-protestreaction/52641560/1; Jonathan Weisman, After an Online Firestorm, Congress Shelves Antipiracy
Bills, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2012, at B6.
147 Timothy B. Lee, If the Feds Can Shut Down Megaupload, Why Do We Need SOPA?,
ARSTECHNICA.COM (Jan. 23 2012, 7:00 AM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2012/01/if-the-fedscan-shut-down-megaupload-why-do-they-need-sopa.
148 Parker Higgins, Hollywood Loves a Sequel -- But Really SOPA 2?, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER
FOUND. (Apr. 6, 2012), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/04/hollywood-loves-sequel-really-sopa-2.
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C. The Common Law Doctrines in a Digital World
In addition to legislation, two doctrines of the common law of copyright—fair use
and secondary liability—are also very important in framing the rights of copyright
owners and ISPs in the online environment.
1. Fair Use
a. The Purpose
For almost as long as copyright has been protected by statute, courts have
recognized the doctrine of fair use as an important counterweight to the monopoly
rights provided by the law.149 Fair use recognizes that if it is an aim of copyright law
to promote creative expression, overly strong copyright protection should be avoided.
Creativity is generally derivative: “There is no such thing as a wholly original
thought or invention. Each advance stands on building blocks fashioned by prior
thinkers.”150 The derivation of new works from old would be impeded by a copyright
protection scheme unlimited by some legally sanctioned fair uses by secondary
creators. In addition to derivative works, new intellectual activity often uses already
created works as references; news reporting, criticism, educational use, and
historical analysis all fall into this category. The absence of legal exceptions to
copyright protection would also impede referential analysis. If the purpose of
copyright is to promote creativity, then, the law must allow some uses unsanctioned
by the copyright owner. Fair use ensures that secondary creators are not completely
prohibited from recycling, reusing, or referencing copyrighted works. As such, it is “a
rational, integral part of copyright, whose observance is necessary to achieve the
objectives of that law.”151
b. Fair Use Factors and Uncertainty
Now codified in U.S. law as § 107 of the 1976 Copyright Act, fair use works as a
positive defense to a claim of copyright infringement. In determining whether a
claim of fair use will succeed, a court will consider the four factors set out in § 107:
“(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the
copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to
the copyrighted work as a whole; (4) and the effect of the use upon the potential
market for or value of the copyrighted work.”152 Courts have held that these four
factors are illustrative, but not exclusive, and that other parameters can also be
Chik, supra note 1, at 252.
Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1109 (1990).
151 Id. at 1107.
152 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
149
150
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considered.153 The factors are also treated as non-conclusive on whether a use is
permitted or not.154 Unfortunately, a vague, non-exclusive and non-conclusive set of
factors have created a doctrine of broad and uncertain application, which has been
heavily criticized as an inadequate protection for those using copyrighted works
without permission. Critics note that “[f]air use cases are often marked by frequent
reversals, split courts and inconsistency even on the Supreme Court level.”155
Twenty years ago, in the pre-internet era, a judge noted that much fair use case law
shows that “[j]udges do not share a consensus on the meaning of fair use.”156 This
state of affairs has not changed much in the digital age where fair use is assuming
new importance as a way of protecting both reuses of copyrighted work by secondary
users using new technology and the new technology creators themselves.
The lack of clarity surrounding the scope of the doctrine’s protection causes
many defendants simply to capitulate when faced with a copyright infringement
claim rather than argue that their particular use constitutes fair use.157 Individual
defendants, such as the creators of UGC, often “lack the resources and knowledge to
defend themselves from threats of copyright action . . . .”158 Many individuals do not
challenge DMCA take down notices on the basis of fair use because it requires
resources and legal knowledge to do so. It is easy to see why many creators of UGC
do not even attempt to reuse or recycle existing copyright materials because they fear
lawsuits or DMCA takedowns.
Some recent empirical studies159 and court cases160 show that the doctrine does
have, or is gradually acquiring, clearer parameters and is, thus, perhaps “fairer” than
its critics allow. However, there is still a perception that copyright holders tend to
aggressively assert their rights and recent cases offer evidence of attempts to actively
suppress uses that benefit society without harming the copyright user.161
Righthaven LLC, a copyright troll, licensed copyrights from several newspapers and
used them to sue large numbers of online users who linked or copied and pasted
these articles to their blogs.162 The Righthaven experiment has been halted, for now,
largely because public advocacy groups like the EFF fought on behalf of some of
Righthaven’s victims to expose that the company lacked ownership of the copyrights
in question and, thus, standing to sue. The EFF also successfully argued that

Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577–78 (1994).
Id.
155 Helman & Parchomovsky, supra note 15, at 43.
156 Leval, supra note 150, at 1106.
157 See Guide for Defendants in Mass Copyright Lawsuits (Bit Torrent Filesharing Cases), NEW
MEDIA
RTS.
(Oct.
10,
2011
10:52),
http://www.newmediarights.org/business_models/guide_defendants_mass_copyright_lawsuits_bit_to
rrent_filesharing_cases.
158 Chik, supra note 1, at 256.
159 Neil Weinstock Netanel, Making Sense of Fair Use, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 715, 720–24
(2011).
160 E.g., Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp. 336 F.3d 811, 818–20 (9th Cir. 2003).
161 See, e.g., Christopher M. Swartout, Toward a Regulatory Model of Internet Intermediary
Liability: File-Sharing and Copyright Enforcement, 31 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 499, 512 (2011).
162 Id.
153
154
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Righthaven was attempting to redefine fair use as restrictively as possible.163
Alarmed at Righthaven’s failures, the music and publishing industries have
requested permission in one of the Righthaven appeals to file an amicus brief to
argue for limiting the fair use defense as they have “an interest in promoting a
balanced and pragmatic approach to fair use as an important affirmative defense to
copyright infringement.”164 Copyright owners would prefer that the doctrine of fair
use continues to provide a Web 2.0 end user, who has used copyrighted material,
with little more than the vague right to hire an attorney rather than a clear and
specific defense.165
c. Fair Use and Web 2.0
The two main Web 2.0 fair use issues are the parameters for reuse of
copyrighted works online and the effect of new technological uses of copyrighted
works. The generative nature of Web 2.0 has undoubtedly created a more
collaborative internet and increased opportunities for the use of copyrighted material
in new ways that may or may not be regarded as infringing by copyright owners. In
one of the most famous examples of overzealous copyright protection, involving an
individual reusing copyrighted works on Web 2.0, Universal Music Publishing Group
(“UMPG”) requested that YouTube remove Stephanie Lenz’s video, posted for friends
and family, of her thirteen-month-old son dancing to Prince’s “Let’s Go Crazy.”166
UMPG claimed the video infringed upon its copyright in the song—although the song
could barely be heard in the background—and sent a takedown notice to YouTube.167
Lenz sued UMPG, seeking a declaratory judgment that her home video did not, in
fact, infringe UMPG’s copyright and eventually won a victory by using the fair use
defense.168 Like Lenz’s video, much UGC is arguably “fair use” of copyrighted works
as it is non-commercial (factor one of the four factor test), but many copyright owners
have reacted violently to almost any unsanctioned use of their works.169 In response,
commentators have argued that the law is strangling creativity online170 and that the
163 Kurt Opsahl, Fair Use for the Win in Righthaven Case, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND.
(Mar. 21, 2011), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2011/03/fair-use-win-righthaven-case. EFF reports
that Righthaven have now appealed this case. See Righthaven v. CIO, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER
FOUND. (Jan. 12, 2012), https://www.eff.org/cases/righthaven-v-cio.
164 Motion of the Ass’n of Am. Publishers & The Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am. for Leave to File
Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 2, Righthaven v. Hoehn Case, No. 11-16751
(9th Cir. Dec. 5, 2012), 2011 WL 7006778.
165 See, e.g., Chik, supra note 1, at 250.
166 Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1152 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
167 Id.
168 Id. at 1153.
169 See Ryan Paul, Oh No You Didn’t:
Warner Hits Lessig vid with DMCA Takedown,
ARSTECHNICA (Apr. 29, 2009 9:05 AM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2009/04/lessigpresentation-on-youtube-hit-with-dmca-takedown-notice/; Michael Arrington, Possibly The Most
(Apr.
5,
2008),
Ridiculous
DMCA
Take
Down
Yet,
TECHCRUNCH
http://techcrunch.com/2008/04/05/possibly-the-most-ridiculous-dmca-take-down-yet/.
170 See CODE 2.0, supra note 21, at 184; JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 26–27 (2d ed.
2006).
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non-commercial use of copyrighted work should be specifically permitted under either
the fair use doctrine or a new statutory exemption.171 Because the passage of new
statutory law is unlikely, the doctrine would benefit from judicial decisions.
Many Web 2.0 cases now revolve around questions of intermediary liability for
users’ online content manipulation. Unfortunately, “the enumerated list of fairness
factors constitutes considerations that were more relevant in a non-digital context
and the pre-internet society . . . .”172 The four factors used to determine whether a
use is fair or not tend to focus on primary infringement in the offline world from the
perspective of copyright owners’ interests and do not take into account “the social
utility and benefits of mechanical and electronic duplication”173 or whether use is for
“a new or value-adding purpose.”174 Those who provide tools that manipulate already
created content in some new way need clarity on what types of uses are
permissible.175 “Despite the importance of fair use involving technologies, our
understanding of technological fair use is thin. Courts have not formally recognized
the concept of ‘technological fair use[]’ . . . .”176 The problem with the paucity of clear
guidance on what constitutes technological fair use is that it is difficult “for
technology companies and venture capitalists to make investments, as companies
and venture capitalists may decide against investing in developing new technologies
that run the risk of a copyright lawsuit . . . .”177 This is leading to a permission-based
culture where requesting permission for new uses is perceived as safer than relying
on the fair use doctrine.178 Judicial guidance for technological fair use is particularly
important given that new technologies are less likely to come from established firms
than from individuals and startups,179 who may not be able to afford to test the limits
of fair use in court.180
Many copyright lawsuits have shown that the copyright industries of music and
film seem particularly likely to undervalue the benefits of new technologies, even
ones from which they subsequently benefit, perhaps because their own business
model has remained relatively unchanged. In any event, these industries have a
history of overreacting to any new technologies that copy content. In recent years,
we have witnessed the advent of several new technologies that have created entirely

Chik, supra note 1, at 270–71, 278–79.
Id. at 254.
173 Id. at 252.
174 Lee, supra note 17, at 835.
175 See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1177 (2007); see also Sony Corp. of
Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 456 (1984) (holding that “[owners of copyrights on
television programs] failed to demonstrate that time-shifting would cause any likelihood of
nonminimal harm to the potential market for, or the value of, their copyrighted works[]” and
therefore the home videotape recorder was capable of substantial noninfringing uses).
176 Lee, supra note 17, at 801.
177 Id. at 802.
178 See Lital Helman, Pull Too Hard and the Rope May Break: On the Secondary Liability of
Technology Providers for Copyright Infringement, 19 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 111, 122, 138 (2010).
179 Lee, supra note 17, at 824.
180 Mark A. Lemley, Cultural Environmentalism @ 10: Should a Licensing Market Require
Licensing?, 70 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS 185, 185–86 (2007).
171
172

[12:70 2012]

The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

92

new markets or transformed the way we use copyrighted materials. 181 Courts have
already determined the fate of VCRs, but new technologies and ways of manipulating
content are created constantly. Viacom v. YouTube182 may yet be appealed to the
Supreme Court, and many current technologies raise questions of fair use not yet
litigated.183 Many new and socially beneficial technologies yet to be discovered will
undoubtedly continue to raise fair use questions as well.
2. Secondary Liability
Clearly, as a matter of positive law, the individuals who post infringing content,
absent fair use, bear responsibility for their actions.184 The question is what types of
activities should give rise to secondary liability for copyright infringement? Although
the Copyright Act does not provide for third party liability for infringement, the
Supreme Court has held that “[t]he absence of such express language in the
copyright statute does not preclude the imposition of liability for copyright
infringements on certain parties who have not themselves engaged in the infringing
activity.”185 U.S. law imposes indirect liability on those who contribute or are
vicariously responsible for the acts of copyright infringers.
a. Three Types of Liability
Modern case law appears to recognize three formulations of secondary liability:
contributory, vicarious and inducement liability.
Contributory copyright
infringement imposes liability for those who knowingly contribute to the infringing
conduct of another.186 Vicarious liability is imposed for those who have “the right
and ability to supervise the infringing activity and also [have] a direct financial
interest in such activities.”187 More recently, the Supreme Court established a third
theory of liability called inducement infringement, where the court considers
“[e]vidence of active steps taken to encourage direct infringement,” including
“statements or actions directed to promoting infringement . . . .”188

181 WILLIAM PATRY, MORAL PANICS AND THE COPYRIGHT WARS 149–50 (2009). And, of course,
copyright owners are often wrong in their assessment of the effects of new technologies. Id. The
DVR, about which Hollywood was so terrified, helped rather than hurt the movie industry. Id.
182 Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19 (2012).
183 See James Boyle, Hot News:
The Next Bad Thing, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 31, 2010),
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/0c1efcf4-3d11-11df-b81b-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1owI7iZs6
(discussing whether intellectual property can be used to protect “hot news”).
184 Helman & Parchomovsky, supra note 15, at 1197–98.
185 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 435 (1984).
186 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1020 (9th Cir. 2001); CoStar Grp., Inc. v.
LoopNet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 550 (4th Cir. 2004).
187 Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971).
188 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 935–36 (2005).
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b. Secondary Liability and Web 2.0
In the first major case where copyright owners sought to block the use of a new
technology, VCRs,189 the Supreme Court determined that if a technology was capable
of “substantial non-infringing uses,” its creators would not be liable for contributory
copyright infringement.190 Sony argued successfully in the case that the main use of
its devices was to allow viewers to record television shows for later viewing (dubbed
time-shifting).191 The Court determined this was a fair use and, thus, held that Sony
could not be liable for contributing to infringement by users on the basis that the
VCR had substantial non-infringing uses.192
The next case to reach the Supreme Court concerning the use of new technology
to infringe a copyright was Grokster. There, the Court clarified the inducement
theory of infringement, stating that the active promotion of copyright infringing
technology created another type of liability.193 The court found Grokster liable for
copyright infringement because “they were aware of, financially benefited from,
participated in, or promoted illegal uses of those devices.”194
As with fair use, the internet era and digital technology create several new
difficulties for the application of the doctrine of secondary liability. After Grokster,
the scope of the common law doctrine became so broad that, in principle, indirect
liability could attach to most active web platforms that enable user participation.195
It is also still somewhat unclear how secondary liability and the DMCA safe harbor
interact. Under one interpretation, if webhosts induce copyright infringement, they
are ineligible for the 512(c) safe harbor.196
III. CASE LAW DEVELOPMENTS IN THE COPYRIGHT WARS
Legislation and the common law doctrines are interpreted in case law, and the
copyright wars between the copyright industries, the new technology companies, and
ISPs continue to be fought in the courts. The next section traces the arguments put
forward by both sides in recent cases. Whether the legal claim is based on fair use,
secondary liability, or the DMCA safe harbor, the copyright owners’ arguments tend
to focus on two themes: the need to compensate them for the value of copyrighted
works, however and wherever those works are used,197 and the need for others to
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 420 (1984).
Id. at 442.
191 Id. at 423.
192 Id. at 456.
193 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 936 (2005).
194 Lavonne Burke, International Media Pirates: Are they Making the Entertainment Industry
Walk the Plank?, 4 J. BUS., ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 67, 81 (2010), available at
http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1054&context=jbel; see Grokster,
Ltd., 545 U.S. at 941.
195 Helman & Parchomovsky, supra note 15, at 1199.
196 Id. at 1206.
197 See, e.g., Monseau, supra note 86, 662–63 (2009); MUSIC BUS. GROUP, RESPONSE TO UK IPO
CONSULTATION ON COPYRIGHT EXCEPTIONS (2008) [hereinafter RESPONSE TO UK IPO
CONSULTATION],
available
at
189
190
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help copyright holders protect their rights because of the new challenges created by
the digital world.198 The main counter themes of the technology industries and their
supporters are essentially that courts should focus on the immense social benefits of
these innovations and that courts should focus on the lack of control over the users of
these technologies.199
There is strong rhetoric on both sides. Viacom’s appeal brief is a good
example.200 It makes a case based on both themes: the value of copyright and the
need for assistance in policing infringement. The brief states that if the judgment in
favor of YouTube were upheld, it “would radically transform the functioning of the
copyright system and severely impair, if not completely destroy, the value of many
copyrighted creations[,]”201 and goes on to claim that “available technology would
have enabled YouTube to easily find and remove the infringing material” on its
site.202 YouTube’s lawyers’ counterargument is that “[t]he safe harbors have allowed
YouTube and services like it to flourish as platforms for creative, political, and social
expression.”203
A. Copyright Industry Arguments and Cases
This section analyzes the copyright industries’ value and policing arguments and
traces their use and success in recent case law.
1. Protection of the Copyright Value Chain
Music was one of the first copyright industries to be affected by digital
technology. Despite the fact that new ways to profit from the digitization of music
files were quickly created,204 music copyright owners focused not on exploring and
monetizing those new business models, but on arguing that any value created by

http://www.ukmusic.org/assets/media/The%20Music%20Business%20Group%20Response%20to%20t
he%20UK%20IPO%20Consultation%20on%20Copyright%20Exceptions.pdf
198 See JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 25–29 (2006); Peter K. Yu, The Copyright Divide,
25 CARDOZO L. REV. 331, 442–43 (2003) (discussing copyright holders’ tendency to lobby the
government and/or solicit support from other industries against digital infringers).
199 Brief for Defendants in Viacom v. YouTube, supra note 80, at 3.
200 Opening Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants, Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19 (2d
Cir. Dec. 3, 2010) (No. 10-3270), 2010 WL 5066007 [hereinafter Opening Brief for Plaintiffs in
Viacom v. YouTube].
201 Id. at 3.
202 Id. at 20–21.
203 Brief for Defendants in Viacom v. YouTube, supra note 80, at 3.
204 See Eric Matthew Hinkes, Access Controls in the Digital Era and the Fair Use/First Sale
Doctrines, 23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 685, 686 (2007). Technology companies
like Apple quickly developed new ways to monetize the new ability to share music files, much like
when VCRs first became available a new industry to rent films sprung up. Id.
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digital music services was due to the use of their creative content for which they
ought to be compensated.205
The statutory copyright monopoly has long been the basis of the copyright
industry business model.206 So wedded are the industries to this model that, in Sony,
the movie studios even objected that the practice of time-shifting deprived them of
value.207 In his dissent, Justice Blackmun stated that “[t]he Studios correctly argue
that they have been deprived of the ability to exploit this sizable market.”208 The
studios did not appear to have indicated that they had plans to exploit this market.
The unfairness was that another entity, the creators of VCRs, had done so without
consulting them. Fortunately, this protectionist argument did not prevail in Sony.209
In considering Sony’s fair use claim, the majority held that “a use that has no
demonstrable effect upon the potential market for, or the value of, the copyrighted
work need not be prohibited in order to protect the author’s incentive to create.”210
The fair use doctrine rests on the concept of value. Three of the four fair use factors
include considerations that relate largely to the value of the copyrighted work,
specifically the purpose and character of the use, the amount of the copyrighted work
used, and its effect on the value of the copyrighted work.211 Innovations in Web 2.0
technology have often involved creating new ways to manipulate and use content; a
few examples would include search, mash-ups and aggregation, tweeting, and
pinning.
In contrast to the explosion of creativity and new uses of content evident on Web
2.0, most copyright industries tend not to be very innovative: “[T]hese industries are
not themselves typically in the business of developing new technologies. The
business models of these industries have remained fairly unchanged for many years-the basic model is to sell and distribute books, music, and movies to the public after
choosing or financing the works.”212 This means that the copyright industries tended
to be very wary of new technologies even before the current innovation in digital
technologies and the advent of Web 2.0.213
There is a good reason that copyright owners cling to the copyright value chain.
It has served them well, enabling them to monetize creative content and helping
them to avoid the difficult business of predicting the success of new technologies. As
Edward Lee explains, established companies and industries, like the copyright
205 Monseau, supra note 86, at 662–63. See generally RESPONSE TO UK IPO CONSULTATION,
supra note 197 (representing the view of the UK music industry, stating in part, “It is imperative
that creators and performers should benefit directly from this value; ultimately it is their creativity
which underpins the entire value chain.”).
206 L. Ray Patterson, Copyright in the New Millennium:
Resolving the Conflict Between
Property Rights and Political Rights, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 703, 706 (2001) (“[D]uring the nineteenth, and
much of the twentieth century, copyright was a regulatory monopoly limited to the marketing of
works and could be defined as consisting of limited rights to which a given work was subject for a
limited period of time.”)
207 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 421 (1984).
208 Id. at 485.
209 Id. at 484–86.
210 Id. at 450.
211 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
212 Lee, supra note 17, at 825.
213 PATRY, supra note 181, at 149–50.
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industries, are often particularly bad at recognizing or developing innovative ideas or
new markets because they are limited by their own value network and their need to
get investors to agree to new business ideas.214
The copyright industries’ poor track record in determining the value of new
technologies was well-established before the acceleration in innovation of the digital
age. There are many examples of technologies that these industries have opposed,
which later have created new businesses from which the copyright industries
themselves have then profited.215 “One (in)famous example can be found in
Hollywood’s unsuccessful attempt to ban the VCR--which eventually brought the
movie studios their biggest source of revenue.”216 The movie studios were wrong
about VCRs217 and may also be wrong about the value that YouTube or other content
sharing sites can add to their bottom lines. As the EFF points out, despite its lawsuit
against YouTube, Viacom is currently already making money directly from its share
of advertising on YouTube and indirectly from the promotional value of the site for
its content.218
Because technological innovation often produces new ways to create value for
copyright owners and others, the law should err on the side of caution when
determining the balance for protecting copyright value against technological
innovation. Copyright owners have complained about each new technological
advance from the time phonographs took over sheet music and have often been
proved wrong about the benefits of new technologies.
We should also be wary of overprotecting the copyright industries from
technological innovation given the relative economic contributions of the major
copyright
industries—film,
music,
and
publishing—and
the
information/communications technology (“IT”) sector to the U.S. economy. According
to the Bureau of Economic Analysis’ statistics, the IT sector grew by almost nine
percent real gross domestic product (“GDP”) between 2006 and 2011 when the
copyright industries saw almost no change remaining at a fairly steady 3.8% of the
U.S. economy.219 As Lee points out, “[t]hese numbers indicate that any sound
economic policy for the United States must attempt to continue to spur the growth of
the IT sector. . . . It would be foolish to cut off our IT growth to spite our copyright
Lee, supra note 17, at 824–25.
Compare Fred Von Lohmann, CEA Defends Home Recording, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER
FOUND. (June 20, 2006 7:24 AM), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2006/06/cea-defends-home-recording
(“The public will not buy songs that it can hear almost at will by a brief manipulation of the radio
dials.”) (quoting Record Label Executive on FM Radio (1925)) with Lee, supra note 17, at 826–27
(“Sometimes, the new technologies foster the development of consumer activities or new markets
that complement or add even more to the copyright holder’s market.”), and Fred von Lohmann, Fair
Use as Innovation Policy, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 829, 841–42 (2008) (“[T]he widespread
deployment of portable digital music players appears to be a factor in the popularity of new digital
download services, including most prominently Apples iTunes Store, which now sells more than five
million songs each day and has become the leading music retailer in the United States.”).
216 Lee, supra note 17, at 826.
217 Id.
218 Abigail Phillips, Viacom Round-Up: Still Complaining About YouTube Even as They Profit
FRONTIER
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(Dec.
17,
2010
12:14
PM),
from
It,
ELECTRONIC
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2010/12/viacom-round-still-complaining-about-youtube-even.
219 Lee, supra note 17, at 828.
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system.”220 So, while copyright protection is necessary to enable content creators to
derive value from their investments, courts should not overprotect copyright when
faced with technology that uses copyright content to create value in new ways. The
purpose of copyright is to promote innovation, and this may sometimes mean
permitting rather than limiting new uses or ways to manipulate copyright content
and create value, even when the copyright holders object that they do not share in
the newly created value. The doctrine of fair use can develop to encourage the
development of new technological uses of copyright.
2. Policing Copyright Infringement
The other oft heard complaint of copyright owners is that copyright infringing
activity is so prevalent, and so much more difficult to combat in the online world than
in the offline world, that the technology companies, whose services enable this
infringement, must assist IP owners in enforcing their legal rights.221 Trademark
and copyright owners both use this argument. This is the rationale for the litigation
around the world against eBay by trademark owners concerned about the sale of
counterfeit products on their site. Trademark owners, like copyright owners, want to
shift the difficult burden of policing the online world onto the technology
companies.222 This argument was most powerfully made in copyright terms by the
music industry against the Napster and Grokster file-sharing services. In Grokster,
the Supreme Court acknowledged that:
When a widely shared service or product is used to commit
infringement, it may be impossible to enforce rights in the protected
work effectively against all direct infringers, the only practical
alternative being to go against the distributor of the copying device
for secondary liability on a theory of contributory or vicarious
infringement.223
In their article, The Best Available Technology Standard, Lital Helman and Gideon
Parchomovsky focus on the difficulties of policing online infringement, stating that
“[t]he high expenditures involved in policing the Internet on a regular basis and
issuing takedown requests may be prohibitive for many content owners, particularly
individual authors, and independent studios and publishers. Cooperation with
webhosts may be the only feasible way to enforce the rights of these content
owners.”224 The doctrine of secondary liability enables copyright owners to focus on
the necessity of assistance in policing online copyright infringement.
While there are undoubtedly copyright owners who suffer economically because
of the online copyright infringement of their works, courts should generally still err
Id.
See Rossi v. Motion Picture Ass’n of Am. Inc., 391 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir. 2004).
222 See, e.g., Tiffany, Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F 3d 93, 109 (2d Cir. 2010).
223 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 929–30 (2005).
224 Helman & Parchomovsky, supra note 15, at 1203.
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on the side of limiting secondary liability for copyright infringement. Copyright
owners have already won very broad and powerful statutory rights that can be used
to chill innovation. The courts are aware of this and need to assume the role of
tempering the balance. In Grokster, where copyright owners argued that the
Grokster file-sharing service was liable for its users’ copyright infringement, Justice
Souter observed that “[t]he more artistic protection is favored, the more technological
innovation may be discouraged; the administration of copyright law is an exercise in
managing the tradeoff.”225 He also agreed that judges should be cautious, noting that
copyright law should be administered with the aim of providing “breathing room for
innovation and a vigorous commerce.”226 The purpose of copyright law must remain
to strike a balance between the rights of copyright owners and the public domain;
this encourages copyright owners to create, while still allowing the public to benefit
from that creativity and encourages secondary users, like technology innovators, to
create new uses of copyrighted works. Statutes lengthening and broadening the term
of copyright protection have skewed the balance in favor of the status quo. Judges
ought to consider this, particularly in light of the innovation and creativity now
enabled by Web 2.0.
While copyright owners have significantly expanded their statutory rights over
the last twenty years, as Justice Souter recognized, judges should be very cautious of
increasing these rights further by fashioning onerous policing burdens for technology
innovators using the doctrine of secondary liability. Developers of new technologies
need the freedom to innovate, and the law can best enable this by limiting secondary
enforcement of intellectual property rights against innovators of new technologies.227
As technological development requires financial investment, it is also necessary for
the law to strive for clarity to enable new companies to attract investors for their
ideas. “Because copyright law ultimately serves the purpose of enriching the general
public through access to creative works, it is peculiarly important that the
boundaries of copyright law be demarcated as clearly as possible.”228 Technological
innovators often do not have large financial resources, and so, in line with the
ultimate purpose of copyright law to encourage creativity, the burden of enforcing
copyright law should be kept as minimal and as clear as possible within the statutory
protections provided to copyright holders.
3. Copyright Industry Successes: Napster and Grokster
The copyright industries were initially quite successful in using their value and
policing arguments to hold new technology innovators liable for copyright
infringement. “Napster [was] the first case to interpret certain provisions of the
DMCA,” when a new online service was sued for copyright infringement by the

Grokster, 545 U.S. at 928.
Id. at 933.
227 Lee, supra note 17, at 824.
228 Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 527 (1994).
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music industry.229 The Napster service was revolutionary at the time, allowing
music listeners to download music files from a central server without charge. The
Recording Industry Association of America (“RIAA”) asked for an injunction to shut
down this music sharing service, making both of the familiar copyright owner
arguments: that the music publishers were being shut out of the value chain made
possible by the new use of their product (music),230 and that Napster should assist
RIAA members in policing its new service.231 Specifically, the RIAA claimed that
“Napster harm[ed] the market in ‘at least’ two ways: it reduce[d] audio CD sales
among college students, and it ‘raise[d] barriers to plaintiffs’ entry into the market
for the digital downloading of music.’“232 The RIAA argued that Napster should have
been helping the RIAA members police infringement of music copyrights.233
The appellate court agreed with the district court that Napster had a
“deleterious effect on the present and future digital download market” and that
Napster had actual and constructive knowledge of direct infringement by the users of
its service.234 The court held that the Sony exemption for a technology with
substantial non-infringing uses did not apply to Napster.235 There was “a clear
distinction between the architecture of the Napster system and Napster’s conduct in
relation to the operational capacity of the system.”236 Napster had apparently
thought it could benefit from the Sony exemption because it did not actually commit
copyright infringement itself, even though it knew the likelihood that its users would
use its file-sharing service to do just that.237 However, the district court dismissed
this argument summarily:
“The evidence indicates that Napster executives
downloaded infringing material to their own computers using the service and
promoted the website with screen shots listing infringing files.”238 This conduct
convinced the court that Napster, with its actual knowledge of infringement, should
not be permitted to seek the benefit of the DMCA safe harbor for its service. Any
defendant who has “actual knowledge that the material or activity is infringing”239 or
is “aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent”240
would be a contributory infringer and not protected by the DMCA safe harbor.241
Napster’s bad faith, while causing the loss of value to copyright owners and turning a
blind eye to policing its service for users’ infringement, was crucial to the RIAA’s
litigation success against Napster.
229 Grace J. Bergen, The Napster Case: The Whole World Is Listening, 15 TRANSNAT’L LAW.
259, 270 (2002); see A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1017 (9th Cir. 2001).
230 A&M Records, Inc., 239 F.3d at 1017.
231 Id. at 1023.
232 Id. at 1016 (quoting A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 913 (N.D. Cal.
2000)).
233 See A & M Records, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 920–21.
234 A & M Records, 239 F.3d at 1017.
235 Id. at 1019.
236 Id. at 1020.
237 Id. at 1021.
238 A&M Records, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 919.
239 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, sec. 202, § 512(d)(1)(A), 112 Stat.
2860, 2881 (1998) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 512(d)(1)(A) (2012)).
240 Id. § 512 (d)(1)(B).
241 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 919 n.24 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
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Unfortunately for copyright owners, the RIAA’s win and the subsequent shut
down of the Napster site did little to either encourage compliance with copyright law
among music listeners or reduce the activities of websites allowing individuals to
share music files online.242 This led the music industry to start pursuing an
aggressive litigation strategy on two different fronts. It began suing its own
customers, the actual infringers, as well as pursuing cases based on secondary
liability theories against other websites and services that enabled infringement.243
One of the next litigation targets was another file-sharing service: Grokster.244
The problem for Grokster was that its whole business model was clearly predicated
on knowledge of the copyright infringing activities of its users. An internal company
e-mail stated:
We have put this network in place so that when Napster pulls the
plug on their free service . . . or if the Court orders them shut down
prior to that . . . we will be positioned to capture the flood of their 32
million users that will be actively looking for an alternative.245
Grokster was clearly designed around the court decision in Napster. This bad faith,
again, made it easier for the plaintiff, MGM, to make the familiar arguments that
Grokster was designed to deprive the copyright owners of the value of their work and
that Grokster was failing to assist the industry in policing the infringing activity that
it knew its site encouraged.246
The Grokster case made it to the Supreme Court, which found unanimously in
favor of the music industry.247 Justice Souter wrote: “We hold that one who
distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as
shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, is
liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties.”248
The justices were mindful that their holding could upset the balance between
the supporting creative pursuits through copyright protection and promoting
innovation in new communication technologies by limiting the incidence of liability
for copyright infringement.249 Nevertheless, a unanimous court imposed indirect
liability on Grokster for its users’ copyright infringing activities because it was
“impossible to enforce rights in the protected work effectively against all direct
infringers, the only practical alternative being to go against the distributor of the
copying device for secondary liability on a theory of contributory or vicarious
infringement.”250 In addition to intent to bring about infringement and distribution
242 See Monseau, supra note 86, at 649; Donald J. Cox Jr., Copyright Laws 10 Years Later—
Downloading Music, 258 N.J. LAW. 37, 39 (2009).
243 See, e.g., Frank Ahrens, Music Industry Sues Hundreds of File Sharers at Colleges, THE
WASH. POST, Apr. 13, 2005, at E01.
244 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 919 (2005).
245 Id. at 924–25 (internal quotation marks omitted).
246 Id. at 939.
247 Id. at 913.
248 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 919 (2005).
249 Id. at 928.
250 Id. at 929–30.
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of a device suitable for infringing use, the recording industry also successfully argued
the inducement theory, which the Supreme Court held required evidence of actual
infringement by users and “[e]vidence of ‘active steps . . . taken to encourage direct
infringement,’ such as advertising an infringing use or instructing how to engage in
an infringing use . . . .”251 There was little dispute between the parties that there
was evidence of infringement by Grokster users on a gigantic scale and that Grokster
knew of and encouraged the infringement.252 It did this in at least three ways,
according to the Court: It satisfied demand from former Napster users, failed to
develop filtering tools, and made money from the infringement by selling advertising
space.253
The Supreme Court was well aware that “[t]he tension between the competing
values of supporting creativity through copyright protection and promoting
technological innovation by limiting infringement liability is the subject of this
case.”254 However, the justices held that “[t]he argument for imposing indirect
liability in this case is . . . a powerful one, given the number of infringing downloads
that occur every day using [respondents’] software.”255 The Grokster service so clearly
and blatantly encouraged mass copyright infringement and failed to make any
meaningful effort to protect copyright content that the balance was very much in
favor of ignoring any benefits of the new technology and protecting copyright owners’
rights.
Despite the strength of the music industry case, the decision in Grokster has
come under some criticism.256 It is a case that attempts to balance the interests of
copyright holders and technological innovators in a way that seems reasonable on its
facts—given Grokster’s clear intentions to reap a financial benefit from the illegal
activities of its users—but the breadth of the decision and the new inducement
theory it creates could be applied to chill innovation and collaboration online. A U.K.
government-commissioned review of intellectual property law counseled against
adoption of the approach taken in Grokster, arguing that the concept of inducement
set out in the case should not be introduced into U.K. law because imposing
“secondary liability on technology purveyors would stifle the availability of public
domain works and may chill technological innovation.”257 The copyright industries
were successful against file-sharing sites like Napster and Grokster, set up primarily
to aid their users in copyright infringement, but other technology innovators, who
have fitted their new services within the DMCA safe harbor infrastructure, have
been more successful in limiting the application of copyright protection to their
services.

Id. at 936 (internal citation omitted).
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253 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 939 (2005).
254 Id. at 914.
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256 See, e.g., Alvin Chan, The Chronicles of Grokster: Who is the Biggest Threat in the P2P
Battle?, 15 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 291, 293–94 (2008).
257 ANDREW GOWERS, GOWERS REVIEW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 102 (2006), available at
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B. The Benefits of Technology and the DMCA Cases
This section considers the technology and internet companies’ counter
arguments based on the theme that their innovations enable creative new uses of
copyright content. In Sony, Justice Blackmun championed the traditional copyright
holders’ position that judges should treat new technology that enabled copyright
infringement with skepticism and should limit the use of any technology that risked
depriving copyright holders of control over their works, saying:
It may be tempting, as, in my view, the Court today is tempted, to stretch
the doctrine of fair use so as to permit unfettered use of this new technology
in order to increase access to television programming. But such an
extension risks eroding the very basis of copyright law, by depriving
authors of control over their works and consequently of their incentive to
create.258
The argument that control of creative works should remain exclusively with the
copyright owners in order to give them an incentive to create did not win in Sony
with the majority determining that the VCR served the public interest.259 The fact
that new technologies can provide great benefits to the public that override the
copyright owners’ value and policing arguments has been successfully argued in
many recent cases, most often where the DMCA safe harbor has been evoked to
protect the technology in question.260
In Napster, the DMCA safe harbor was introduced as a defense, but the Ninth
Circuit declined to consider the issue: “We do not agree that Napster’s potential
liability for contributory and vicarious infringement renders the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act inapplicable per se. We instead recognize that this issue will be more
fully developed at trial.”261 However, courts have started to be more receptive to the
idea that new technologies can provide “great value to the public[,]”262 and technology
companies have started to use the DMCA safe harbor to insulate their services from
claims of copyright infringement.
1. Early DMCA Cases
In one of the earliest cases to invoke the DMCA, In re Aimster Copyright
Litigation,263 a case which, like Napster and Grokster, concerned a music file-sharing
service, the safe harbor defense was unsuccessful because of the bad faith and lack of
social value of the Aimster service.264 The Aimster service encrypted file transfers
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 480–81 (1984).
Id. at 425.
260 See, e.g., UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners, LLC., 667 F.3d 1022, 1050 (9th
Cir. 2011).
261 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1025 (9th Cir. 2002).
262 Perfect 10, Inc. v. Google Inc. 416 F. Supp. 2d 828, 848–49 (C.D. Cal. 2006).
263 In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 252 F. Supp. 2d 634, 638, 655 (N.D. Ill. 2002).
264 Id. at 659.
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between users and argued that this encryption prevented the company from knowing
if any particular transfer included copyright material, so that it was impossible for it
to gain actual knowledge or awareness of facts and circumstances from which it could
conclude that its service was being used for copyright infringement.265 “Defendants’
encryption argument, clever though it may be, does not convince us that they lack
actual knowledge of infringement.”266 Like Grokster, the whole service was
predicated upon “furnishing a ‘road map’ for users to find, copy, and distribute
copyrighted music.”267 Thus, the court had little difficulty finding Aimster’s
argument that it was protected by the DMCA safe harbor § 512(c) “by reason of the
storage at direction of a user”268 unconvincing. The court agreed that the safe harbor
provisions were not conditioned upon a service provider “monitoring its service or
affirmatively seeking facts indicating infringing activity,”269 and it clearly accepted
that the DMCA represented a legislative determination that copyright owners, not
service providers, must bear the burden of policing for infringing activity.270
However, in the view of the court, Aimster lost any chance to claim § 512(c) safe
harbor protection because, although it had a written policy to remove repeat
infringers, in reality, it did not do so. Aimster used the disingenuous argument that
its own encryption system prevented it from identifying any infringers. Holding that
Aimster was not entitled to the safe harbor because its actions enabled its users’ to
commit copyright infringement, the court agreed with the Plaintiff’s brief which
stated, “Aimster predicates its entire service upon furnishing a ‘road map’ for users
to find, copy, and distribute copyrighted music.”271 The Aimster court, like several
subsequent decisions,272 clearly confirmed that the DMCA requires copyright owners
to bear the brunt of policing infringement, but the court was not prepared to allow a
provider that set up its service so that it could not monitor its users’ infringement to
benefit from its wrongfulness. Aimster’s clear bad faith actions to blind itself to its
users’ activities prevented it from gaining any traction with an argument about the
social benefits of its service.
A series of lawsuits by Perfect 10, an online provider of adult entertainment,
enabled the Ninth Circuit to clarify several important issues in protecting webhosts
and internet service providers. For example, it pointed out that copyright owners
should police their property online and that determinations on the common law
doctrines of fair use or secondary liability claims are irrelevant as to whether or not
the DMCA safe harbor defense is available.273
In Perfect 10 v. CCBill LLC, the Ninth Circuit made clear that it was not the job of
internet service providers to police their sites for copyright infringement. The
appellate court stated, “[t]he DMCA notification procedures place the burden of
Id. at 641.
Id. at 651.
267 Id. at 652.
268 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2012).
269 In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 252 F. Supp. 2d 634, 657 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (citing 17 U.S.C.
§ 512(m)).
270 Id.
271 Id. at 652.
272 See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1113, 1117 (9th Cir. 2007).
273 Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1176–77 (9th Cir. 2007).
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policing copyright infringement—identifying the potentially infringing material and
adequately documenting infringement—squarely on the owners of the copyright. We
decline to shift a substantial burden from the copyright owner to the provider[.]”274
Having been unsuccessful in shifting the burden to police for copyright
infringement to internet service providers, copyright owners have tried to limit the
application of the DMCA safe harbor in other ways, generally arguing that the
various DMCA safe harbors are lost by particular activities of the internet service
providers or webhosts.
When Perfect 10 sued Google’s image search service,275 the Ninth Circuit found
that the search service was protected as fair use, did not constitute secondary
copyright infringement, and was likely entitled to the protection of the DMCA.276
The district court had not originally considered the DMCA claim because it
determined that Google was not secondarily liable on contributory or vicarious
liability grounds for copyright infringement.277 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held
that the determination of secondary liability was separate from the DMCA defense
and focused on the fact that Google and Amazon’s search services were beneficial to
the public.278 It noted that the Supreme Court “has directed us to be mindful of the
extent to which a use promotes the purposes of copyright and serves the interests of
the public.”279
Copyright owners have repeatedly attempted to argue that the DMCA safe
harbors should not apply to most Web 2.0 content-sharing websites because it is well
known to the webhosts that their sites attract a high proportion of copyright
infringing content. This is an attempt by copyright owners to destroy ISPs
contentions about the social benefit of their services by alleging that the ISPs know
that so much copyright material is infringing.
In UMG Recordings v. Veoh Networds,280 a district court in California
determined that Veoh’s internet-based video-sharing service was protected by the
DMCA safe harbor from music industry claims of secondary liability for copyright
infringing user-submitted videos. The Ninth Circuit upheld this decision in
December 2011,281 unfortunately, after legal costs associated with the case forced
Veoh into bankruptcy.282 UMG had argued that Veoh must have known that some of
the content in the user videos was unauthorized, given its general knowledge that its
services could be used to post infringing material.283 UMG urged the court that this

Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1113 (9th Cir. 2007).
Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1175 (9th Cir. 2007).
276 Id. at 1176–77.
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278 Id. at 1166.
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280 UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks Inc. 665 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1018 (C.D. Cal 2009).
281 UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners, LLC., 667 F.3d 1022, 1026 (9th Cir.
2011).
282 Eliot Van Buskirk, Veoh Files for Bankruptcy After Fending Off Infringement Charges,
WIRED (Feb. 12, 2010 3:49 PM), http://www.wired.com/epicenter/2010/02/veoh-files-for-bankruptcyafter-fending-off-infringement-charges.
283 UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners, LLC, 667 F.3d 1022, 1036 (9th Cir.
2011).
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fact sufficiently demonstrated Veoh’s knowledge of infringement284 and constituted a
so-called “red flag,”285 which should have alerted Veoh to take down the infringing
videos. Judge Fisher upheld the district court decision, saying that “Veoh’s general
knowledge that it hosted copyrightable material and that its services could be used
for infringement is insufficient to constitute a red flag.”286
In its lawsuit against YouTube, Viacom has continued to press the argument
that awareness of facts and circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent
can be satisfied by a generalized knowledge that a service can be used for copyright
infringement.287 While this seems an issue that has finally been decided on the side
of ISPs,288 other issues of the application of the safe harbor and copyright law remain
unclear or unresolved by case law.
2. Viacom v. YouTube Saga
The facts of the long running Viacom v. YouTube dispute are simple. Viacom
objected to the widespread availability of clips from its TV shows on YouTube.289
Viacom’s main argument focuses on the theme that Viacom needs help policing the
dangerous online environment that is rife with copyright infringement and that
YouTube is failing to provide this help. In its appeal brief, Viacom reiterated that
“YouTube could easily have discovered and removed the massive quantities of
infringing videos” on the service.290 In Viacom’s view, “YouTube had the ability to
forestall virtually all infringing activity during the upload process through the use of
commercially available fingerprint filtering technology . . . .”291 Viacom claimed that
because YouTube knowingly enabled the uploading of large amounts of copyrighted
videos, YouTube should have become liable for the copyright infringement of its
users.292 These claims intend to demonstrate that ISPs, like YouTube, are not
beneficial because they are acting in bad faith in providing users with easy ways to
infringe copyright when they should be assisting copyright owners with policing their
sites and allowing them to share in the new value created by their copyright content.
YouTube countered with the familiar focus on the theme that its service is
socially beneficial. According to YouTube, “[t]he safe harbors have allowed YouTube
Id.
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, sec. 202, § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii), 112 Stat.
2860, 2880 (1998) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii) (2012)). Under this provision,
the safe harbor will only apply if “in the absence of such actual knowledge, [the service provider] is
not aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent[.]” Id.
286 UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners, LLC, 667 F.3d 1022, 1038 (9th Cir.
2011).
287 Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 31 (2d Cir. 2012).
288 Id. at 31–32. The Appeals Court discussed various recent decisions on the DMCA and,
while declining to adopt the reasoning of those courts, said: “we note that no court has embraced the
contrary proposition—urged by the plaintiffs—that the red flag provision ‘requires less specificity’
than the actual knowledge provision.” Id.
289 Id. at 26.
290 Opening Brief for Plaintiffs in Viacom v. YouTube, supra note 200, at 45.
291 Id.
292 Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 33–34 (2d Cir. 2012).
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and services like it to flourish as platforms for creative, political, and social
expression.”293 Its service “has allowed performers and artists to rocket from oblivion
to fame; has given politicians, pundits, protesters, and the Pope a powerful new way
to communicate with the public[.]”294 These accomplishments are only possible
because Congress realized that internet services would be valuable and revolutionary
and embedded a safe harbor into the DMCA to protect them.295
Often commentators have also convincingly argued that the benefits of Web 2.0
technologies (and particularly the creation of UGC) include economic, social, and
public interest concerns in terms of human rights, “particularly free speech and selfexpression, political and artistic truth, and free press.”296 An amicus brief by
intellectual property and internet law professors linked the substantial benefit
YouTube and other Web 2.0 sites provide to the public with the DMCA.297 The
“extraordinary and unprecedented growth in innovative Internet services” is only
possible because of the DMCA.298
Without the limitations on liability provided by the DMCA’s safe harbors,
the legal exposure for a service provider relying upon vast numbers of users
freely exchanging content with one another would be entirely
unmanageable; a business built on such a foundation could hardly have
attracted financing in any rational marketplace, given the astronomical
scope of the potential liability.299
This statement illustrates how copyright law could inhibit the growth of Web 2.0
platforms. The law provides for vast damages to be awarded for copyright
infringement absent a showing of actual loss. This creates significant potential
financial risks for technology innovators and for their investors and explains why the
DMCA safe harbor is so crucial to promoting investment in new technology.
At the district court level, Judge Stanton was certainly persuaded that the
DMCA safe harbor protected YouTube’s service,300 stating succinctly that “[g]eneral
knowledge that infringement is ‘ubiquitous’ does not impose a duty on the service
provider to monitor or search its service for infringements.”301 The fact that much
material uploaded to YouTube infringed copyright was irrelevant, unless YouTube
ignored specific notifications about infringing content. Judge Stanton decided that
YouTube did not have knowledge of “specific and identifiable infringements.”302
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Viacom immediately appealed Judge Stanton’s decision, clearly hoping to
impose a much stronger duty to monitor for copyright infringement on YouTube and
other service providers and also limit any fair use arguments about the reuse of
copyrighted material. Viacom claimed in a press release that “America’s economic
future will be largely built on innovation, information and the growth of trade in
intellectual property. However, an information-based economy cannot exist if the
products and ideas developed are not protected under U.S. law.”303 This ignores that
much current innovation in the U.S. is in communications and information
technology and that U.S. law, in the form of the DMCA safe harbor, does protect that
innovation by placing the duty to monitor copyright infringing activity on the
copyright owner and not on the internet service provider who has created the new
technology. The legislative intent was clearly to encourage the development of the
internet.304 The explosive growth in technology and creation of Web 2.0 suggests that
the policy of placing the policing burden on copyright owners rather than the creators
of new technology has been successful in promoting the innovation in the
“information-based economy” described by Viacom.
Copyright owners, like Viacom, dislike the DMCA safe harbors for Web 2.0 sites,
like YouTube, because the protections require that copyright owners must either use
the takedown notification system created by the DMCA to request removal of
copyright content or litigate individually against infringers.305 Although judges have
now clearly interpreted the takedown system as placing the duty to police copyrights
squarely on the copyright owners.306 Service providers are not required even to
monitor their sites for infringement unless they are made aware of facts and
circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent.307 However, Viacom is still
arguing that copyright owners require more protection.308 Apart from the lack of
policing and monitoring assistance required of ISPs by the DMCA, copyright owners
also dislike the notification and the takedown system used under the Act because
much non-commercial UGC probably meets fair use standards, and some users will
not be silenced by a takedown notice.309 However, the efficacy of the current
takedown system is remarkable, as is pointed out by YouTube in its appeal brief:
“YouTube implemented a rigorous and efficient notice-and-takedown program that
made it easy for copyright owners to send takedown notices[.]”310 In fact, at one
point, Viacom sent 100,000 takedown notices to YouTube in the course of one day,
and YouTube was able to remove the vast majority of the infringing videos from view
by the next business day.311
Judge Stanton’s judgment in Viacom stands out as noticeably more supportive of
technology companies than do earlier decisions in cases like Napster and Grokster.
303 Viacom
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VIACOM,
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In his judgment, he focuses heavily on the benefit of the YouTube service and the
shield provided by the DMCA: “To let knowledge of a generalized practice of
infringement in the industry, or of a proclivity of users to post infringing materials,
impose responsibility on service providers to discover which of their users’ postings
infringe a copyright would contravene the structure and operation of the DMCA.”312
Stanton has been criticized for expanding the DMCA safe harbor by finding that
general knowledge of massive infringement does not constitute a “red flag.” The
argument is that there is no distinction in his judgment between knowledge of actual
infringement and awareness of facts and circumstances from which infringing
activity is apparent.313 However, copyright owners, in seeking such enormous
statutory damages from legitimate and useful web services, may have themselves to
blame for the approach of judges, like Stanton, to the statutory construction of the
level of knowledge of infringing activity to cause an internet service to lose DMCA
safe harbor protection.
Viacom’s potential statutory damages claim for the
approximately 150,000 clips it alleged infringed its copyrights314 could cripple most
ISPs, including YouTube. With a broad definition of “red flag” knowledge, any Web
2.0 platform and its investors would be in danger of incurring massive potential
liability for infringement by allowing sharing on their site. The size of statutory
damages claims could be enormous for the infringement of even a few copyrighted
works against copyright owners because the legal risks of liability for copyright
infringement are unmanageable without the DMCA safe harbors. If a court finds
that any service provider has actual or “red flag” knowledge of copyright
infringement and is ignoring it, a massive and crippling damages award is the likely
result. This should make, and has made, courts cautious of holding that otherwise
socially beneficial services fall outside the safe harbor.
The amici brief filed by intellectual property and internet lawyers focused on the
theme of the social benefit of Web 2.0, warning that if Viacom prevailed on appeal,
“tomorrow’s Internet will almost assuredly be less innovative, less dynamic, and less
participatory than today’s, as developers of new, user-driven services and
applications—and the people who invest in them—reassess the risks and costs of
doing business online.”315
Although the eagerly awaited appeal decision in Viacom overturned parts of
Judge Stanton’s decision and was thus seen as a victory for Viacom by some,316 it in
fact broadly upheld the most important part of Stanton’s judgment, especially that a
generalized knowledge of infringing activity does not cause an ISP to lose safe harbor
Id. at 523.
Ben Scheffner, Viacom v. YouTube: A Disappointing Decision, But How Important?
COPYRIGHTS
AND
CAMPAIGNS
(June
27,
2010),
http://copyrightsandcampaigns.blogspot.com/2010/06/viacom-v-youtube-disappointing-decision.html.
314 First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Damages and Demand
for Jury Trial at 2, Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F.Supp.2d 514 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 2008)
(Nos. 07-cv-02103 (LLS), 07-cv-03582 (LLS)), 2008 WL 2062868.
315 Brief of Amici Curiae Intellectual Prop. & Internet Law Professors in Support Of
Defendants-Appellees at 29, Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. Apr. 7, 2011)
(Nos. 10-3342-cv, 10-3270-cv), 2011 WL 1461438.
316 E.g., Brian Stelter, Appeals Court Revives Viacom Suit Against YouTube, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
5, 2012 2:40 PM), http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/04/05/appeals-court-revives-viacomsuit-against-youtube/.
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protection.317 The court commended the district court for identifying that the crux of
the inquiry with respect to YouTube’s copyright liability was whether the statutory
phrases “actual knowledge that the material or an activity using the material on the
system or network is infringing,” and “facts or circumstances from which infringing
activity is apparent” would encompass a general awareness that such activities are
infringements (as urged by Viacom) or would require actual or constructive
knowledge of specific and identifiable infringements of individual items.318 Judge
Cabranes, writing for the majority, held that interpretation of the language of the
DMCA compelled the decision that “the basic operation of § 512(c) requires
knowledge or awareness of specific infringing activity”319 and therefore general
awareness of infringement is insufficient to lose this DMCA safe harbor protection.
Judge Cabranes explained his holding that general knowledge was not enough to lose
safe harbor protection in terms of the section’s requirement for removal of any
infringing material, stating that “expeditious removal is possible only if the service
provider knows with particularity which items to remove. Indeed, to require
expeditious removal in the absence of specific knowledge or awareness would be to
mandate an amorphous obligation to ‘take commercially reasonable steps’ in
response to a generalized awareness of infringement.”320
Judge Cabranes then drew a new distinction in DMCA case law between
subjective knowledge, which he saw as covered by the “actual knowledge”
requirement in § 512(c)(1)(A)(i), and objective knowledge, which he held meant
knowledge of “facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent;”
covered by § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii).321 This division of knowledge of specific infringing
activity into two sorts provides a role for both sections. The judge did not accept the
Viacom argument that knowledge of “facts or circumstances from which infringing
activity is apparent” expanded secondary liability to web hosts and ISPs with a
generalized knowledge of infringement activity, nor did his two types of knowledge—
subjective and objective—require webhosts to take steps to monitor their sites for
infringement.322 The Second Circuit’s main disagreement with Judge Stanton was on
whether summary judgment was premature given that, on the facts of the case, “a
reasonable juror could conclude that YouTube had actual knowledge of specific
infringing activity, or was at least aware of facts or circumstances from which specific
infringing activity was apparent.”323 The Second Circuit also remanded the decision
for fact finding on three other questions. First, it asked whether YouTube willfully
blinded itself to knowledge of specific infringement while noting that “willful
blindness cannot be defined as an affirmative duty to monitor.”324 Second, it rejected
Stanton’s construction of whether YouTube “receive[d] a financial benefit directly
attributable to the infringing activity, in a case in which [it had] the right and ability

Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 30 (2d Cir. 2012).
Id. at 29.
319 Id. at 30.
320 Id. at 30–31.
321 Id. at 31.
322 Id. at 31–32.
323 Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 34 (2d Cir. 2012).
324 Id. at 35.
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to control such activity.”325 This put the court at odds with the construction of the
section recently adopted by the Ninth Circuit in Veoh, which was the same as
Stanton’s: namely that the “right and ability to control” under § 512(c) requires
control over specific infringing activity the provider knows about. The Ninth Circuit
held that an ISP’s general right and ability to remove materials from its service is,
alone, insufficient.326 The difficulty with this construction is summed up by Judge
Cabranes:
Any service provider that has item-specific knowledge of infringing activity
and therefore obtains financial benefit would already be excluded from the
safe harbor under section 512(c)(1)(A) for having specific knowledge of
infringing material and failing to effect expeditious removal. No additional
service provider would be excluded by section 512(c)(1)(B) that was not
already excluded by section 512(c)(1)(A).327
However, although the appellate court did not agree with Judge Stanton or the
Ninth Circuit on what an ISP had to know in order to be excluded from the safe
harbor by § 512(c)(1)(B), it also disagreed with Viacom’s interpretation of this
provision as a codification of the common law doctrine of vicarious liability.328 It
determined, somewhat unhelpfully, that the “right and ability to control” infringing
activity “requires something more than the ability to remove or block access to
materials posted on a service provider’s website.”329 The more difficult question,
according to the court, was how to define the “something more” that is required.330
Unfortunately, the court’s answer to this question was not to provide guidance on
when an ISP would lose safe harbor protection and become liable for infringement
because it had the right and ability to control infringing activity. The court
remanded the case to the district court for more fact finding on whether Viacom had
adduced sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable jury to conclude that YouTube had
the right and ability to control the infringing activity and received a financial benefit
directly attributable to that activity.331 It is important that subsequent decisions
clarify what type of ability to control users’ activity will lead to the loss of the safe
harbor protection.
Both the Ninth Circuit and Second Circuit agree that
§ 512(c)(1)(B) does not import vicarious liability into the DMCA, essentially a victory
for ISPs over the copyright owner argument that ISPs should help police copyright
infringement because they control the activity on their sites. The Ninth Circuit
decision has the virtue of being clearer for service providers—only the failure to
control specific infringing activity will cause the loss of the safe harbor under
§ 512(c)(1)(B).
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Lastly, while the Second Circuit accepted that certain of YouTube’s software
functions were ones that it undertook “by reason of the storage at the direction of a
user,” it determined that one software function was “the closest case” and might
cause the safe harbor to be lost.332 The court agreed with the district court that
transcoding, playback (functions which involve making copies of videos that are
viewable over the internet and delivering these copies to users’ browsers), and the
“related videos” function (an algorithm that identifies and displays thumbnails of
“related” videos for users to view) could all be said to be functions related to and
following from the storage itself.333 However, the court was not convinced that one of
YouTube’s software functions—third-party syndication or licensing—similarly fell
within the safe harbor that protects activities done “by reason of” user storage,
although it appeared that none of the clips in suit were actually syndicated.334
Altogether, the court remanded four issues to the district court for further fact
finding. These were whether the record showed that YouTube had actual or objective
knowledge or awareness of specific acts of infringement; whether the record showed
that YouTube willfully blinded itself to specific infringements; whether YouTube lost
the safe harbor protection by reason of receiving a financial benefit from activities it
had the right and ability to control (and what was meant by right and ability to
control in this section); and whether any of the clips-in-suit were syndicated to a
third party and, if so, whether such syndication was a software function that could be
said to be by reason of the storage at the direction of the user335 so that YouTube
could claim the protection of the § 512(c) safe harbor for that activity.
The appellate court has at least clarified that specific, not general, knowledge of
infringing activity is required for loss of the safe harbor protection in § 512(c). But
what remain murky are the sort of facts that will constitute objective knowledge of
facts and circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent, what constitutes
willful blindness, and what type of control over user activity and what software
functions might cause the loss of the safe harbor protection. These details may be
worked out from a remand and examination of the factual record in Viacom or they
may require more decisions. There is little doubt that, given YouTube’s expeditious
compliance with Viacom’s takedown notice for over 100,000 clips, most, if not all, of
the clips-in-suit are protected by the DMCA safe harbors, and this particular case
has shrunk to questions about, at most, a tiny number of videos—all long since
removed from YouTube’s site. Despite the remand, the case does not substantially
advance the main copyright owners’ arguments that they should be able to control
and derive value from all uses of copyrighted work and that ISPs should be required
to help them police the internet for infringement. However, there are still some gray
areas for ISPs on the value and policing arguments. What level of knowledge of
specific acts of infringement, what type of control over users, and what specific
software functions will lead to a loss of the crucial safe harbor protection?

Id. at 38, 40.
Id. at 40.
334 Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 40 (2d Cir. 2012).
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C. Technology Users
The discussion in this paper has so far focused mainly on copyright owners and
technology innovators. However, in the copyright wars, there are three conflicting
constituencies affected by the development of new technologies for manipulating
content. As well as copyright owners and technology innovators, whose battles have
been the most familiar to the courts in recent years, the rights of users of the new
technologies are often in conflict with those of copyright owners. The common law
doctrine of fair use is the most relevant legal concept for protecting the rights of the
third constituency, although it is also increasingly relevant as a defense for
technology innovators themselves.336 In his dissent in Sony, Justice Blackmun
argued that the fair use doctrine only permits copyrighted works to be used without
consent of the owner for “socially laudable purposes.”337 However, the majority in
Sony held that any use that served the public interest (in that case, the interest was
increasing access to television programming) could be a fair use.338 Fair use has
often been criticized even before the recent Web 2.0 explosion as vague and unclear.
Courts have had difficulty in applying it to new technology,339 while copyright owners
have continued to argue forcefully that any clarification or extension of the doctrine
risks depriving them of control of the value of their work and thus of incentives to
create.340
As various commentators have recognized, the protection of fair use should be
more than an exception to copyright protection. It should be treated as an integral
part of the copyright scheme if the objective of copyright law is truly to promote
innovation.341 The purpose of fair use is to prevent copyright owners from
overprotecting their works by requiring permission for the reuse of their content,
even when it is reused in ways that are creative and transformative.342
Transformative uses actually further the objectives of copyright law rather than
thwart them. Unfortunately, the standard four factors used to determine whether or
not a particular use is fair343 tend to relate better to traditional offline uses of
existing copyright by primary infringers in activities such as news reporting,
commentary, and education. The factors are not as well adapted for determining
whether the creation of new ways to manipulate existing copyright material by
technology innovators is beneficial and serves the public interest in some way.344
One of the obvious ways that Web 2.0 tools serve the public interest is the way
that they have facilitated the creation of UGC. Some people have argued that typical
UGC should always be protected as fair use.345 It complies with many of the factors
See Lee, supra note 17, at 802.
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 479–80 (1984) (Blackmun,
J., dissenting).
338 Id. at 425, 456.
339 See, e.g., Lee, supra note 17.
340 See Opsahl, supra note 163.
341 Leval, supra note 150, at 1107.
342 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
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344 See, e.g., Lee, supra note 17, at 802.
345 See, e.g., Chik, supra note 1.
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in the four factor test for fair use. It is transformative, non-commercial, and
generally does not affect the market for a copyrighted work. However, uncertainty
about whether or not a court will always apply the fair use exception to protect UGC
likely chills at least some creative reuses of existing copyright materials. Web 2.0
users create vast amounts of UGC,346 and a specific statutory exemption for UGC has
been suggested.347 A clear rule that permits typical non-commercial transformative
UGC, so that the creators and enablers of UGC need not fear takedown notices or
lawsuits, could potentially promote the ISPs theme that the web is socially beneficial
by encouraging online innovation.
Canada has recently amended its copyright law to include a specific exception
for non-commercial UGC.348 The Gowers Review of U.K. Intellectual Property Law
also suggested a similar change to U.K. law, which would require the creation of a
specific exception in the European Union Copyright Directive for UGC.349 Gowers
argued that this would enable creators to rework materials to create new value and
even new markets.350 In making his argument, he pointed to the broader fair use
exception in U.S. law as the reason for the vitality of online creativity in the U.S.351
The more recent Hargreaves Review also recommended that U.K. law be amended to
exempt non-commercial uses and UGC from copyright infringement.352 Both the
U.K. and Canadian copyright regimes have traditionally container fewer and more
limited exceptions to copyright law than the U.S., and like Gowers and Hargreaves,
various commentators have pointed to the benefits of the broader fair use exception
under U.S. law for fostering creativity.353 Ironically, however, because the broader
fair use exception is dependent on a number of factors, decisions as to whether
particular UGC is permissible are made on a case-by-case basis, which renders fair
use into an uncertain doctrine. The protection of particular uses only clear from a
court decision rather than a reading of a statute with a specific exception. This
causes technology users and innovators to avoid relying on the uncertainty of the
protection provided by the exception. Thus, they will either avoid using the material
or seek permission from the copyright owner, both of which chill innovation.
UGC is not the only type of new use of copyrighted material where technology
creators and users would benefit from a clearer understanding of what is and is not
legally permissible as fair use. Many other new uses of copyrighted material are
being made possible through Web 2.0 innovations.
Various internet search
services,354 the Google books project, and new Web 2.0 sites, like Pinterest,355 allow
346
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users to manipulate material on the internet in different ways. More new online
services are likely to be created. Some will be fads, but others may create new value
and even new markets.356 It is a hallmark of the Web 2.0 world that it has created,
and continues to create, many new tools to manipulate and make sense of data.
These innovations will inevitably continue to give rise to new questions about
whether or not they constitute fair use of the material reused. Courts will likely
wrestle with issues relating to new technological uses of copyrighted materials until
the parameters of technological fair use357 become clear. It would be preferable for
these parameters to be set by court decisions rather than by private agreements
where technology providers seek permission from copyright owners to use copyright
work, giving rise to a permission-based culture rather than a creative one.
It is often hard, even for the creators of new technologies, to assess at their
inception what the benefits of the technology may be,358 so courts should avoid as
much as possible decisions which limit or prohibit technologies that make new uses
of copyrighted works. The guiding principle should be to protect copyright as
minimally as necessary to encourage content owners to continue to create. Justice
Souter’s advice in Grokster, that copyright law should be administered with the aim
of providing “breathing room for innovation and a vigorous commerce,”359 should be
followed rather than the outcome of that case, which held that the technology in
question was not a fair use essentially because of the bad faith of its promoters.360
There are far fewer precedents considering technology in terms of fair use than in
terms of the DMCA. Court decisions are needed to provide clarity and legal certainty
on the parameters of fair use because it is a needed protection in order to promote
new and innovative technological uses of content online.
IV. FOSTERING THE DEVELOPMENT OF WEB 2.0 WITHOUT DESTROYING THE CONTENT
This section describes the lessons, so far, from the case law concerning copyright
on Web 2.0 and considers what questions remain uncertain or unanswered. It argues
that recent judicial decisions have been generally helpful in shaping and fostering
Web 2.0 innovation by interpreting the DMCA safe harbor broadly and limiting the
application of copyright secondary liability without destroying copyright owners’
incentives to create content. But, the coverage of secondary liability for webhosts
and the parameters of fair use protection for new technologies are still unclear.
The growth of Web 2.0 shows no sign of abating361 and Web 3.0 and the creation
of further new uses of “big data” (which will likely often include copyrighted
What is Pinterest?, PINTEREST, http://pinterest.com/about (last visited Dec. 2, 2012).
See GOWERS, supra note 257, at 66.
357 Lee, supra note 17, at 802 (discussing the concept of technological fair use).
358 Famously, the creators of Twitter did not initially know how to earn money from its service.
See, e.g., Stephen E.F. Brown, Twitter Without Revenue Valued Near $250M, S.F. BUS. TIMES (Jan.
27, 2009 10:01 AM), http://www.bizjournals.com/sanfrancisco/stories/2009/01/26/daily9.html.
359 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 933 (2005).
360 Id. at 941.
361 Key Facts, FACEBOOK, http://newsroom.fb.com/content/default.aspx?NewsAreaId=22 (last
visited Dec. 3, 2012).
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materials) are apparently just around the corner.362 While the Second Circuit
clarified some important aspects of the DMCA safe harbors for ISPs in Viacom, it has
unfortunately prolonged the uncertainty about other aspects by choosing to remand
the case for further fact finding. There may also yet be an appeal of this decision to
the Supreme Court.
At this juncture, it remains hard to predict with certainty the future balance of
power on the web between copyright content owners, service providers, and
technology users. Although, it is probably safe to assume that there will be both
further attempts to legislate stronger copyright protections and more litigation.
Copyright owners continue to claim that “massive online piracy” is destroying
value and that it is making the burden of policing copyrights online too great to
manage without help. Webhosts and ISPs are less cohesive as a group, but have
focused on how the technological innovations of Web 2.0 enable socially and
economically beneficial creativity to flourish and argued that technology creators
should not be blamed for any copyright infringement of their users. Users want to
enjoy the ability to post, link, tweet, pin, mash, sample, or manipulate content in
other yet-unknown ways without fearing liability for copyright infringement.
Courts have, so far, clearly held that, in the majority of circumstances, copyright
holders should be responsible for policing their own copyrights online and that this
burden cannot be shifted to ISPs, absent some evidence of bad faith on their part.
The Grokster and Napster services demonstrated this bad faith, but the websites
Veoh and YouTube generally did not. The DMCA safe harbor for actions related to
“storage at the direction of the user” has now been interpreted in several cases to
place the burden of policing copyrights online on the copyright holder and not to
import secondary liability law into the DMCA. Copyright owners have not been
successful in either the Ninth Circuit363 or the Second Circuit364 in arguing that this
safe harbor protection is lost through a general awareness that a site is used for
infringing activity. Rather, ISPs must be aware of, or willfully blind to, specific
instances of infringement on their sites and ignore them in order to lose the safe
harbor protection. What remains unclear is what types of activities carried out by
webhosts can cause the loss of the safe harbor protections. What level of knowledge
of evidence relating to infringement, or level of willful blindness to this kind of
evidence by the webhost or service provider, will result in a loss of protection of the
safe harbor protections? Are there other common software activities in which
webhosts or service providers engage that will result in a loss of protection? The
appeal court in Viacom called the syndication of users’ videos by YouTube “the closest
case”365 and declined to decide whether or not this activity related to “storage at the
direction of the user” and was thus protected by the safe harbor or whether it was a
commercial activity which would cause the loss of the protection of the DMCA. There
are likely other types of software activities undertaken by webhosts that may cause
them to lose safe harbor protection and expose them to secondary liability for their
users’ actions. As far as possible, legitimate webhosts of UGC should be able to avoid
See, e.g., Metz, supra note 41.
See UMG v. Shelter Capital, 667 F3d 1050 (9th Cir 2011).
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secondary liability for the activities of their users if they expeditiously remove
material, which they are informed is infringing. Therefore, webhosts need to be clear
on which activities are permissible and which will cause them to lose the safe harbor
protection and become liable for any infringement on their sites.
Many ISPs and technological innovators use existing copyright material, and the
doctrine of fair use is the obvious way to protect innovative new uses of content from
restriction by copyright owners. However, courts have not yet considered fair use
much in relation to recent Web 2.0 innovations, and its parameters and protection
need to be clarified by case law. The fact that new ways to manipulate copyrighted
material do not immediately create value for the copyright owner has often been used
as an argument by copyright owners to prohibit use of those materials.366 However,
oftentimes, even the creators of new technologies are unclear initially as to what
value or market their technology will create.367 There have also been several
instances where valuable new markets for the copyright owners have been created by
new technologies that the same copyright owners initially treated with great
suspicion and alarm.368 With the rise in new technologies, fair use is an obvious
choice as a defense for technology companies. However, it appears that many
consider it too risky to rely on fair use as a strategy for investing in developing new
technologies and prefer to license permissible uses.369 Hopefully, this cautious
approach changes for the sake of future technological development. Judges need to
clarify fair use so that it provides breathing room for new technologies to develop and
find investors.
Absent aggressive, new, SOPA-like copyright legislation providing stronger
statutory secondary liability claims against a broad array of internet services,
lawsuits based on the DMCA safe harbor and the common law doctrines of secondary
liability and, to a lesser extent, fair use will remain the most likely method of
regulating the various constituencies creating content, inventing new technologies,
and using Web 2.0 tools.

366 This argument has been made in most digital copyright cases from Sony to Viacom. See
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 483 (1984); Viacom Int’l, Inc. v.
YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 36, 38 (2d Cir. 2012); Raymond T. Nimmer, Content Protection and
Copyright, in 15TH 2009, at 84 (PLI Pats., Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Prop. Course
Handbook Ser. No. 19139, 2009), available at WL, 984 PLI/Pat 81.
367 See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 958 (2005)
(Breyer, J., concurring).
368 See, e.g., Phillips, supra note 84.
369 See generally Jessica Litman, Antibiotic Resistance, 30 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 53
(2012). Professor Litman notes that dozens of start-ups relying on fair use and DMCA defenses to
copyright infringement have been shuddered in the last ten years. Id. at 53. Further, she argues
that, since such start-ups are subject to unpredictable and expensive litigation, investment has
flowed to two groups that rely on permissible uses rather than fair use: distribution systems owned
by copyright owners themselves, and “new entrants with the stamina and resources to survive
copyright infringement suits.” Id. at 65.
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CONCLUSION
Judicial decisions are gradually creating a clearer picture of the liabilities of ISPs
and technology companies for the use of creative content on their sites. These sites
are the generative heart of Web 2.0, and their development is essential to ensuring
the web’s continued potential as a transformative technology. Sites from YouTube to
individual blogs, wikis, and social media platforms, like Facebook, are all being used
to create and disseminate a wealth of information and cultural material,370 and it is
important that copyright owners—powerful under the status quo—are not able to
dictate the terms on which information is accessible and used through these sites
without input from other web users. Copyright owners are an older, more wellorganized lobbying group than are technology and ISPs and have, until recently,
been successful in protecting and strengthening their rights through legislation.371
But, courts ultimately interpret those rights. Recent judicial developments have
started to clarify the protections afforded by the DMCA safe harbor provisions372 and
also have removed some of the pressure from webhosts and ISPs regarding their
secondary liability for copyright infringement by their users. However, the doctrine
of fair use remains underdeveloped in the Web 2.0 world. It would benefit
technological innovators and serve the public interest for courts to clarify the fair use
doctrine to cover all socially beneficial new technologies that use copyrighted
materials in a transformative and/or non-commercial way. Clear judicial decisions
are good for encouraging investment in online innovation. They can restore a fairer
balance in intellectual property law between the rights of copyright owners and the
rights of technology innovators and users—a balance that has been skewed by recent
legislation.
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